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ABSTRACT 
Prediction markets are speculative markets created for aggregating relevant 
information on some measurable future event. Simply put, prediction markets ask 
participants to trade ideas as stocks. The “market price” of a particular idea or 
contract can then be interpreted as the probability that an event will occur, or as 
a feedback mechanism regarding how well some course of action is working. The 
application and utility of prediction markets to military strategy and decision-
making has yet to be adequately tested in any real or empirical way. This thesis 
seeks to understand the conditions under which the application of a prediction 
market would be both successful and useful to military commanders. To test this, 
markets were established with three different organizations and included more 
than 135 participants. Upon the closing of the markets, results and participant 
surveys were analyzed. The data collected indicate that such a tool could be 
quite useful if employed and illuminate a variety of challenges that must be 
addressed in order to implement a prediction market in a military unit. 
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In 1968, the USS Scorpion (SSN-589), a Skipjack-class nuclear 
submarine was lost at sea while crossing the Atlantic on the way to her homeport 
of Norfolk, VA. The Navy’s initial search and rescue efforts were fruitless, as they 
conducted an unproductive search westward from the last known location of the 
Scorpion. It was not until many weeks later that Dr. John Craven, a scientist in 
the Navy’s Special Project Division, was brought in to help. Craven’s theory was 
that the Scorpion had been lost due to a catastrophic failure caused by a “hot 
running torpedo.” He posited that the crew of the Scorpion likely turned the 
vessel 180 degrees (heading eastward) in an attempt to disarm the weapon.1  
Craven reached his conclusion by aggregating the opinions of submarine 
and salvage experts regarding both the fate and location of the Scorpion, asking 
them to place bets on a map of the sea floor. The map was covered in gridded 
squares that contained the likely probability of the submarine’s location according 
to Craven’s calculations. In order to provide incentive (a crucial aspect of 
determining the actual interest of the individual) the participants bet bottles of 
Chivas Regal.2 Despite Craven’s confidence in his prediction, the Navy continued 
to search westward. It was not until October, after the Navy had nearly called off 
the search and Craven lobbied for an additional two weeks to search eastward, 
that the Scorpion was found—within 220 yards of where Craven and his team 
predicted. Craven’s method, in effect, was a crude version of a prediction market.   
The United States Military of 2012 stands in stark contrast to the same 
force of 40 years ago. Equipment is more technologically advanced, the service 
members are better protected and training is more extensive. Perhaps in no 
other area is this difference more pronounced than in the arena of intelligence 
                                            
 1 Sherry Sontag, Christopher Drew, and Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The 
Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 99.  
2 Sontag, Drew, and Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, 104.  
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analysis and information management.3 While the components of our intelligence 
and information systems have progressed, the fundamental issue of effective 
information aggregation that faced Dr. Craven during his search for the USS 
Scorpion remains.   
Current operations conducted by the U.S. military, regardless of theater, 
are not faced with a dearth of intelligence and information, but rather with an 
abundance of it. According to Major General Michael T. Flynn, “There are literally 
terabytes of unclassified and classified information typed up at the grassroots 
level.”4  The result of this dilemma is not a problem of information availability, but 
of information aggregation. CIA analyst Puong Fei Yeh summarizes the issue 
when he asks “How do you aggregate, in a timely way, disparate pieces of 
information that are spread among and within 15 U.S. intelligence agencies into 
relevant products?”5 
Put another way one might ask, “What is the modern day equivalent of 
betting a bottle of scotch?”  We posit that the answer lies in prediction markets.  
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
In effect, Craven’s process amounted to a non-electronic prediction 
market, drawing on the knowledge of others and aggregating the information to 
postulate a probability of success. Prediction markets are speculative markets 
created for the purposes of aggregating relevant information on some 
measurable future event; in short, prediction markets ask participants to trade 
ideas as stocks. The “market price” of a particular idea or contract can then be 
                                            
 3 John C. Gannon, “Managing Analysis in the Information Age,” in Analyzing Intelligence: 
Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, eds. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 214. 
 4 Michael Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul Batchelor, “Fixing Intel,” CNAS.org, accessed May 
10, 2012, www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_ 
voices.pdf. 
 5 Puong Fei Yeh, “Using Prediction Markets to Enhance U.S. Intelligence Capabilities,” 




interpreted as the probability that an event will occur, or as a feedback 
mechanism regarding how well some course of action is working. Prediction 
markets have become nearly commonplace forecast tools, used by companies 
such as Google and Hewlett-Packard, to predict the success of various initiatives 
and create sales forecasts. Additionally, prediction markets have been used to 
predict everything from the severity of the flu season in a particular year, to the 
outcome of presidential elections.6, 7  To this point, prediction markets have yet to 
be fully examined in the context of military decision-making. A brief attempt at 
this was made in 2003 with the creation the Defense Advanced Research Project 
Agency’s (DARPA) Futures Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP) Policy 
Analysis Market (PAM). Prior to the establishment of this market designed to 
trade in predictions related to strategic policy and potentially catastrophic events, 
the project was abruptly cancelled based on ethical and moral concerns raised 
by some in Congress. As a result, the application and utility of prediction markets 
to military decision-making has yet to be adequately tested in any real or 
empirical way.   
This thesis seeks to understand the conditions under which prediction 
markets can be an effective decision-making tool for military commanders or 
institutions. In keeping with this theme, our research is focused primarily on the 
concerns of implementation rather than questions of accuracy or an in depth 
deconstruction of market function.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Among the things we are interested in; several questions naturally rise in 
importance. Our chief research questions then are:  
                                            
6 Philip M. Polgreen, Forrest D. Nelson, and George R. Neumann, “Use of Prediction Markets 
to Forecast Infectious Disease Activity,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 44, no. 2 (2007), accessed 
April 17, 2012, http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/44/2/272.full.pdf+html. 
7 Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Forrest Nelson and Thomas Rietz, “Results From a Dozen 
Years of Election Futures Markets Research,” Ch. 80, 742–751 in Handbook of Experimental 
Economics Results, Vol 1, Part 5, Ed, Charles R. Plott and Vernon l. Smith, Elsevier, accessed 
April 17, 2012, http://econpapers.repec.org/repec:eee:expchp:5–80. 
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 What are the features of market design that might encourage 
participation in/from military units/individuals? 
 What market attributes are useful for military decision (prediction) 
markets (number and type of contracts, length of market)? 
 How might a military unit employ prediction markets and what types 
of units might find prediction markets useful? 
 What are the challenges associated with the use of prediction 
markets in military decision-making? 
Through experimentation and interviews, we hope to not only answer 
these questions, but also to offer a first suggestion for the implementation of 
prediction markets to serve as an aid to the military decision maker.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Despite being relatively new in concept, prediction markets have been the 
focus of a great deal of research. Broadly speaking, the literature falls into two 
categories: prediction market theory and empirical study and application. In 
addition, empirical study can be further segmented into three separate areas of 
research: accuracy, function, and implementation. 
In terms of theory, Friedrich Hayek proposed the notion that markets are 
perhaps the most efficient aggregators of information. In what has become 
known as the efficient market hypothesis, Hayek emphasized the importance of 
what is now known as tacit knowledge. Hayek suggests that decisions based on 
properly aggregated information are theoretically superior in both substance and 
efficiency to decisions crafted by experts alone.8 Cass R. Sunstein who 





                                            
8 Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” 1945, Library of Economics and 
Liberty, accessed April 5, 2012, http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw1.html.  
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concept even further. His research posits that deliberating groups are vulnerable 
to a wide range of failures ranging from the amplification of cognitive errors to 
group polarization.9   
The prediction market is, at its most basic level, an effort to overcome this 
type of shortcoming in decision-making. Robin Hanson of George Mason 
University summarized this notion by saying, “speculative markets are a 
neglected way to help us find out what people know. Such markets pool the 
information that is known to diverse individuals into a common resource, and 
have many advantages over standard institutions for information aggregation, 
such as news media, peer review, trials, and opinion polls.”10  In his bestselling 
book, The Wisdom of Crowds, author James Surowiecki illustrates the potential 
advantages of collective intelligence. Offering examples such as the 91% 
accuracy of the “Ask the Audience” lifeline on the hit TV show Who Wants to be a 
Millionaire, the behavior of the stock market immediately following the explosion 
of the Challenger space shuttle in 1986, and the Iowa Electronic Market’s (IEM) 
performance in predicting political elections, Surowiecki deftly points out the 
potential of collective intelligence and prediction markets.11  In short, prediction 
markets provide a previously unrealized opportunity to overcome the type of 
cognitive heuristics and negative group dynamics that plagued the U.S. Navy in 
their search for the Scorpion and naturally occur in many institutions, whether 
civilian or military.   
The application and empirical study of prediction markets has been 
strikingly deep and robust given its relatively recent appearance on the academic 
scene. For instance, Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, and Reitz detail the evidence of 
perhaps one of the best known prediction markets, the Iowa Electronic Market  
                                            
9 Cass R. Sunstein, “Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s Challenge to 
Habermas),” John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper no. 321, The Law School, The 
University of Chicago, accessed April 17, 2012, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/321.pdf. 
 10 Robin Hanson, “Decision Markets,” IEEE Intelligent Systems Magazine, May/June 1999, 
accessed April 5, 2012, http://hanson.gmu.edu/decisionmarkets.pdf. 
 11 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of the Crowds (New York: Anchor Books, 2004) 4, 7, 18. 
 6 
which has not only yielded accurate predictions, but has clearly outperformed 
conventional polling applications.12 Pursuing the primary source data even 
further, University of Pennsylvania Professor Justin Wolfers and Dartmouth 
Professor Eric Zitewietz detail the extent to which private industry has embraced 
the technology and the results therein. They analyze the accuracy and design of 
various markets such as Intrade (Intrade.com) and the Hollywood Stock 
Exchange (HSX.com).13  Additionally, the critical design elements of an accurate 
market are explored in detail. Their conclusions are unequivocal: given proper 
market construction, application and participation, the accuracy of prediction 
markets is significant.14   
As a result of the attractive forecasting potential of prediction markets, 
there has been no shortage of attempts to use them in a wide variety of contexts 
and applications. Hospitals have attempted to use them to predict bed space 
during particularly busy days, while SimExchange (simexchange.com) utilizes 
them to predict the sales of video games. In this vein, which is to say civilian 
entrepreneurship, the literature on prediction market implementation is robust in 
its depth and detail. We feel that prediction market research is incomplete when it 
comes to the concept of military implementation or strategic decision-making. 
This particular gap provides a critical point of departure for prediction 
market research. To date, there has been no research conducted on the viability 
of prediction markets within military, or even “military-like” organizations, short of 
DARPA’s failed PAM project. While there are clear conclusions that can be 
drawn from the published research with regards to the utility of prediction 
markets for civilian enterprise, without further research, it cannot be 
unequivocally stated that these same deductions will apply in a military context.   
                                            
 12 Berg, Forsythe, Nelson and Rietz, “Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures 
Markets Research.”  
13 Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, “Prediction Markets,” Journal of Economic 
Perspective, 18(2), 2004. 
14 Wolfers and Eric, “Prediction Markets,” 114.  
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To that end, this thesis seeks to contribute to the existing body of research 
by employing prediction markets within a range of military organizations and 
compare the results with what is currently understood and supported about 
prediction markets in the civilian sector. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This research seeks to build on the robust body of knowledge related to 
the applicability of the prediction market. First, a review of the mechanics of a 
prediction market was conducted and various constraints and limitations were 
identified. Secondly, a practical experiment with a prediction market was 
conducted with three different organizations. We attempted to use this empirical 
observation to understand how the previously mentioned constraints apply to a 
prediction market in the context of a military organization. Finally, 
recommendations on potential utility, market design, and implementation of 
prediction markets as a decision making tool were provided.   
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Initially, prediction markets are explained in depth and a brief background 
of their use is discussed. This explanation is provided to discern and understand 
how they function and the various components that comprise a market, as well 
as the advantages and disadvantages for using such a methodology. 
Additionally, this chapter offers several examples of both historical prediction 
markets and current applications.  
Chapter III details our experiment design and methodology for the three 
prediction markets that we ran in support of this thesis. As discussed previously, 
our experimentation focused on the implementation of prediction markets within 
military organizations and sought to build on previous research that supports the 
accuracy and functional mechanisms of prediction markets. This chapter also 
details the units that participated in our study and the rationale for their selection. 
Finally, we describe and elaborate on the experimental market’s framework and 
the incentive structure for its participants.  
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The next section outlines our results for each market, including the 
number and basic demographics of the participants, the average volume of 
market activity, the number and nature of participant comments, and an overall 
assessment of the market’s success. This chapter also expounds upon areas of 
potential improvement to the market’s design in such a way that future iterations 
are more effective and illustrative. 
Finally, we offer our conclusions and recommendations for further 
research. Detailed market data and survey data are included in the appendices.   
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II. BACKGROUND AND PREDICTION MARKET FUNCTION 
A prediction market, also known as an “event market” or “information 
futures market,”15 is at its most basic level an information aggregator. The 
conceptual framework for this notion resides in the efficient market hypothesis 
and the consideration that, “In a truly efficient prediction market, the market price 
will be the best predictor of the event and no combination of available polls or 
other information can be used to improve on the market-generated forecasts.”16  
This efficiency is a result of rational trading in the market, which in turn is a 
function of a trader’s knowledge base. In short, a rational trader will “put his 
money where his mouth is” to the extent that his accumulated knowledge allows 
him to do so. It is also important to note that a market need not consist entirely of 
rational traders to operate efficiently. An efficient market however does require 
the rationality of marginal traders, which is based on the Marginal Trader 
Hypothesis (MTH).17  In essence, the MTH holds that a small group of active and 
well-informed traders are responsible for steering market price to efficient 
levels.18  These marginal traders serve to explain how potential pitfalls such as 
market manipulation and uninformed trading can not only be overcome, but are a 
necessary component of an efficient market. Prior to any further discussion of 
benefits and limitations however, it is necessary to discuss the actual market 
mechanics and composition that are necessary for a prediction market to 
function. 
The first requirement is a clearly stated claim that is both exhaustive and 
exclusive. These claims, or contracts, are a critical basic component to any PM. 
                                            
15 Wolfers and Eric, “Prediction Markets,” 108.  
 16 Ibid., 108. 
 17 Thomas Clay McManus and Calvin Blackwell, “An Exploration of Market Efficiency and the 
Marginal Trader Hypothesis,” Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1, Article 9: 1, 
accessed May 14, 2012, http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099& 
context=uer. 
 18 Ibid., 2. 
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According to Wolfers and Zitzewitz, contracts must be “clear, easily understood, 
and easily adjudicated.”19 For example, a contract asking traders to bet yes or no 
on a statement such as “Bashar al-Assad will soon be deposed as President of 
Syria” is far too ambiguous and conflated, and many traders will likely dismiss it, 
opting for contracts with an exhaustive list of possibilities and a clearly defined 
expiration date. However, a contract of this type could be rephrased to include an 
exhaustive list and a date by which the event is likely to occur, e.g., “Bashar al-
Assad to no longer be President of Syria before midnight ET 31 Dec 2012.” 
The challenges of crafting these contracts is best summarized by 
examining a contract from the internal prediction market created by Siemens in 
1998.20  In this particular instance the wording of the contract entitled “Can the 
project be finished in the planned time horizon?”21 created enormous confusion 
when the customer of the project in question changed their requested deadline. 
Without a definitive and pre-defined outcome, the creators of the market were 
forced to close it, and subsequently re-create it with a newly defined completion 
date. 
In addition to the wording of the contracts, another important attribute is 
the contract type. Two of the most common types of contracts are winner-take-all 
and index. In a winner-take-all contract, a contract will cost $p (0<p<1) and will 
pay $1, if and only if a specific event occurs, and $0 if it does not. Assuming a 
market is risk neutral, meaning that there is neither a preponderance of risk 
averse or risk inclined participants, this price $p can be interpreted as the mean 
                                            
19 Wolfers and Eric, “Prediction Markets,” 120.  
 20 Gerhard Otner, “Forecasting Markets ‘An Industrial Application,” March 1998, Draft 
Working Paper, accessed May 14, 2012, http://ebweb.at/apsm/fmaia2.pdf.  
 21 This contract poses issues of clarity beyond the unspecified completion date as well. The 
terms “project” and “finish” are also fairly ambiguous as they assume that every market 
participant understands the definition as the market designer intended it. An improved contract 
would properly define both of these terms as well as provide an unequivocal date, whether driven 
by the customer or not. 
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belief of a market that an even will occur.22  In an index contract, the cost is 
represented as $y , where y rises and falls as a function of market activity. These 
types of contracts can be used to predict specific values such as the number of 
percentage points of the popular vote candidate “X” might receive in an 
upcoming election; contracts of this type will be settled in accordance with the 
real value, e.g., a contract estimating 51.5% of the popular vote will pay $51.50.  
While payoffs that are made in this manner are the most common and 
straightforward, they are not the only ones available to market creators. Slamka 
et al. conclude that there are alternative payoff mechanisms, referred to as 
second generation payoff mechanisms, that perform nearly as well as the payoff 
methods mentioned previously.23 Slamka et al. tested three different 
mechanisms against the standard “first generation” methods listed above that 
require an actual outcome. The first was volume weighted average price (VWAP) 
of a security during a given time period. The second was the last price of a 
security and a predetermined and publicly known point in time, and the third was 
the final price at a random point in time. None of these methods require an actual 
outcome in order to pay off or “resolve” a contract. The demonstration that these 
payoff methods have demonstrated accuracy commensurate with first generation 
payoff mechanisms dispels the notion that a prediction market contract must 
have an actual and verifiable outcome in order to be a viable security in the 
marketplace. This finding is of enormous significance in that it opens the door to 
the application of prediction markets to previously unconsidered environments 
such as evaluating new product ideas or forecasting long-term events. 
                                            
 22 Steven Gjerstad, “Risk Aversion, Beliefs, and Prediction Market Equilibrium,” (paper 
presented at the American Economic Association, ASSA Conference, Boston, MA, January 6–8, 
2006), accessed May 14, 2012, http://www.aeaweb.org/assa/2006/0106_1015_0701.pdf. 
 23 Christian Slamka, Wolfgang Jank, and Bernd Skiera, “Second-Generation Prediction 
Markets for Information Aggregation: A Comparison of Payoff Mechanisms,” 1, July 2009, 




After a contract (or a series of contracts) has been clearly articulated to 
the satisfaction of both the creators and participants, an asset and trading market 
mechanism must be defined in order to facilitate trading. Generally, the two most 
common assets to be traded are “real” money and “play” money. Because real 
money trading inside the United States poses a variety of legal barriers, the 
largest of which are the anti-gambling laws,24 “play” money is often substituted 
with only a marginal decline in market accuracy.25  Once the asset structure is in 
place, the next critical component is the trading mechanisms. 
While there are a variety of trading mechanisms from which to choose, the 
most prolific among modern prediction markets are the Continuous Double 
Auction (CDA) and Market Scoring Rules (MSR). In a CDA market, securities are 
traded via buy and sell orders by individual traders in much the same way that it 
occurs in a typical financial securities market. One distinct disadvantage of such 
a mechanism is the size and activity level required to generate property liquidity. 
Take for example a small CDA market consisting of perhaps only 20 participants. 
In such a market, the amounts of securities that are available for purchase are a 
function of the numbers of participants willing to sell, and vice versa. In this case, 
contract prices can often stall due to inactivity.26 
To overcome such a disadvantage, the MSR method was developed by 
George Mason University Economist Robin Hanson in 2003. The MSR is a 
mathematical algorithm that allows buyers and sellers to purchase or sell some 
quantity of a contract at any given time.27  In short, if a market participant views 
the price/probability of a given contract as too high or too low, they may purchase 
                                            
 24 Robin Hanson, “Combinatorial Information Market Design,” Information Systems Frontiers, 
5:1 (2003): 107, accessed May 15, 2012, http://hanson.gmu.edu/combobet.pdf. 
 25 Emile Servan-Schreiber, Justin Wolfers, David M. Pennock and Brian Galebach, 
“Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?” Electronic Markets 14, 3 (2004): 250, accessed May 
15, 2012, http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/DoesMoneyMatter.pdf.  
 26 Jed D. Christiansen, “Prediction Markets: Practical Experiments in Small Markets and 
Behaviours Observed,” The Journal of Prediction Markets1 (2007): 30, accessed May 15, 2012, 
http://inklingmarkets. com/static/jpm_jedchristiansen.pdf.  
27 Hanson, “Combinatorial Information Market Design,” 110. 
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or sell the contract without the need for a willing buyer or seller as the algorithm 
fills that void and completes the transaction. In addition to providing an 
advantage in terms of market function and liquidity, an MSR based market also 
provides a tertiary benefit in the form of simplicity and ease of use.   
Following the establishment of a market framework that includes well-
defined contracts and a user-friendly interface, a variety of participatory 
questions must be addressed. The first of which being, What is the proper size of 
an effective market?  To answer this question, Jed Christiansen conducted a 
series of 39 separate prediction markets consisting of 183 individual traders 
based on a series of rowing races in the UK and utilizing an MSR algorithm 
rather than a CDA framework.28  In his comparison of bands of participation 
within various markets, Christiansen delineates four groups for evaluation 
consisting of markets with traders numbering 0–10, 11–15, 16–20 and 20 or 
more. His findings are as surprising as they are informative. The market size with 
the most calibrated29 results is the 16–20 trader range 30 with the “20 or more” 
only slightly less so, indicating that markets with as few as 16 traders can 
produce well calibrated results.   
The second participatory question that must be answered is:  What 
incentivizes a trader to participate?  While early research indicated that monetary 
gain was the most prevalent incentive for trader participation (based largely on 
the accuracy of the markets trading in actual currency, such as 
www.intrade.com),31 Christiansen indicates that community, uniqueness of the 
event, personal stake, and competition are actually more important. Christiansen 
is not the only researcher to come to this conclusion. Stefan Luckner, compared 
and contrasted a number of incentive schemes in his 2006 research regarding 
                                            
 28 Christiansen, “Prediction Markets,” 23. 
 29 In this case, the term “calibration” refers to the comparison between market prices 
(reflective of trader judgment) and actual results of the regattas in question.   
 30 Christiansen, “Prediction Markets,” 29. 
31 Ibid., 32. 
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the 2006 FIFA World Cup. His findings were a direct challenge to the notion that 
traders were motivated solely by financial gain.32 In point of fact, the incentive 
scheme that provided the most accurate results was one in which each 
participant was provided a flat rate payment of 50 euro, refuting the claim that 
each separate trade must provide a tangible or monetary reward for a market to 
remain effective. 
A. BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES 
While much of the attraction regarding prediction markets has revolved 
around the notion of successful forecasting accuracy, they also have key 
supplementary benefits as well. Dynamic feedback, the potential prevention of 
cognitive errors, and the increased incentive for follow-on research are aspects 
of prediction markets that have a great deal of utility. In fairness, however, 
prediction markets are not without their disadvantages; issues such as contract 
design and a lack of market participation can cripple a market despite the best of 
intentions. 
1. Benefits 
Organizations develop and make use of forecasts or estimates in a variety 
of ways. Quantitative estimates such as a sales forecast or an estimate of new 
clients gained in the coming quarter are relatively intuitive to understand and 
compare to actual outcomes. Determining accuracy therefore becomes a 
relatively straightforward process of juxtaposing assessments versus reality. On 
the other hand, qualitative forecasts or estimates are much harder to objectively 
observe and measure. An example of this sort of estimate might be to measure 
change in customer service or to change the attitudes of employees. In these 
examples, the use of a prediction market mechanism might be an effective 
means of objectively measuring these subjective topics.  
                                            
32 Stefan, Luckner, “Prediction Markets: How Do Incentive Schemes Affect Prediction 
Accuracy?” Negotiations and Market Engineering, ed. Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and 
Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt,(Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany, 2007), accessed May 15, 
2012, http://drops. dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1002/.  
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Another benefit to using prediction markets may be to reduce or prevent 
cognitive errors common to forecasts and estimates. Many studies have shown 
that collective intelligence offers better decisions than pure deliberating groups 
and even acknowledged subject matter experts.33 Putting subjective 
assessments such as those that might be seen in the intelligence community or 
within a commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) into a prediction 
market could provide an objective “buy in” of the organization’s employees as to 
the true accuracy and relevance of such assessments.  
Also, the use of prediction markets can provide an incentive to conduct 
additional research and incentivize the release of revelatory information. 
Participants trade in the market based on a variety of motivations but regardless 
of their inherent compunctions it is logical to assume that many traders will be 
motivated to conduct their own research in order to trade more effectively.34  This 
in effect, is integrating additional information that may have been heretofore 
unknown either to the trader, the market at large, or the organization.     
2. Disadvantages 
As with any method, prediction markets are no panacea to the forecaster. 
Prediction market implementation comes with a unique set of challenges ranging 
from design to administration. Establishing a market is not a free proposition, as 
time, capital, and credibility must be spent. If an organization is then faced with a 
significant lack of participation this might serve to highlight some form of internal 
dysfunction within the organization.    
While many prediction markets can be created and ready for use very 
quickly, a rush to implementation will most likely result in less than desirable 
market design, accuracy and participation. Crafting contracts that are both 
thoughtful and well-constructed is difficult, requires uncommon expertise, and 
involves all major stakeholders within the organization. Overly ambiguous or 
                                            
 33 Sunstein, Cass R., “Deliberating Groups.”  
34 Wolfers and Eric, “Prediction Markets,” 121. 
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overly simplistic contracts are generally uninteresting to the trader and can lead 
to issues with accuracy and participation. Once the market is established, 
administrators must be responsive to both trader and market needs while taking 
care not to unduly influence the behavior of the trader. For the organization that 
chooses to implement a prediction market, finding the right balance between 
these issues is paramount to market success.  
Generally, and in addition to poor contract design, one of the more 
destructive problems that prediction markets face is a lack of participation. 
Employees may be reluctant to participate in a prediction market for any number 
of reasons and barriers. These barriers, inasmuch as they can be mitigated, 
should be. A severe lack of participation within a market is significant in that it 
may highlight other problems inside the organization ranging from an 
underestimation of an employee’s time constraints or an employee’s perception 
that the organization is apathetic about their point of view.    
B. MARKET EXAMPLES 
Prediction markets have been used by many companies for many 
reasons. Google used prediction markets to forecast demand for their products 
and timelines for innovation,35 Hewlett Packard used markets for sales 
forecasts,36 and hospitals have used prediction markets to forecast demand for 
services (doctors, medicine, beds, etc.).37 These are but a small sample of the 
successful use of prediction markets as an information aggregation tool. Notably 
                                            
 35 Bo Cowgill, Justin Wolfers, and Eric Zitzewitz, “Using Prediction Markets to Track 
Information Flows: Evidence from Google,” Auctions Market Mechanisms and Their 
Applications 14 (2009): 3–3, accessed May 15, 2012, http://namcub.accela-
labs.com/stories/pdf/GooglePredictionMarket Paper.pdf. 
 36 Charles R. Plott and Kay-Yut Chen, “Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Concept, 
Design and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem,” Social Science Working Paper 
1131 (2002), accessed May 15, 2012, http://www.hpl.hp.com/personal/Kay-
Yut_Chen/paper/ms020408.pdf. 
 37 David Rajakovich and Vladimir Vladimirov, “Prediction Markets as a Medical Forecasting 
Tool: Demand for Hospital Services,” The Journal of Prediction Markets (2009) 3 2, accessed 
May 15, 2012, http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid= 
522676a1–94ef-4b66–81a5-d4dbf7343681%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=7.  
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missing among these examples is a discussion of prediction market use within 
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). In fact, to date there has only been one 
large-scale experiment with prediction markets inside of DoD. That experiment, 
known as the Policy Analysis Market (PAM), was cancelled before it ever began.  
PAM was officially announced in 2001 and was managed by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The market was designed to 
cover eight middle east nations and to focus on “five parameters for each nation: 
its military activity, political instability, economic growth, U.S. military activity, and 
U.S. financial involvement,” with the ultimate goal of forecasting  military and 
political instability.38  The project was headed by retired Admiral, and former 
National Security Advisor, John Poindexter. In July 2003, Senators Ron Wyden 
and Byron Dorgan released an open letter to Poindexter complaining that the 
PAM would allow terrorists to bet on terrorist attacks, in effect profiting from 
planning and carrying out attacks. The Senators went on to suggest that 
“spending millions of dollars on some kind of fantasy league terror game is 
absurd and, frankly, ought to make every American angry,” while also 
highlighting the involvement of Poindexter who had been convicted for his role in 
the notorious Iran-Contra scandal.39 The next day, the PAM project was 
terminated, with Poindexter resigning days later. As Hanson points out, “the 
dominant initial reaction to PAM seemed visceral and intuitive rather than 
analytic.”40  As such, a novel attempt at determining whether “market-generated 
predictions could improve upon conventional approaches to forecasting”41 was 
lost.   
                                            
 38 Robin Hanson, “The Policy Analysis Market (A Thwarted Experiment in the Use of 
Prediction Markets for Public Policy),” Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization,  
(Summer 2007), vol. 2, no. 3, 77. 
39 Ibid., 79. 
40 Hanson, “The Policy Analysis Market,” 80. 
41 Puong Fei Yeh, “Using Prediction Markets to Enhance U.S. Intelligence Capabilities,” 




Today, the research arm of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is 
actively pursuing prediction market research in a renewed attempt to improve the 
way that future events and outcomes are predicted. The Intelligence Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (IARPA) is currently funding two public prediction 
markets; Forecasting ACE (Aggregative Contingent Estimation) and Forecasting 
World Events (FWE). While neither market administrator has been forthcoming 
with their market statistics, it appears as though both fall within the norms of 
reported market participant behavior statistics; “20% of the traders conducting 
80% of the trades.”42  
The Forecasting ACE market is led by Applied Research Associates 
(ARA), who manages a team of scientists from ARA and leading universities who 
hope to move beyond simple averaging of forecasts and into the realm of why 
some people forecast more precisely than others. The end goal is to improve not 
only intelligence analysis, but also forecasting in other areas such as economics, 
business, medicine and logistics.43 Categories covered in the market include: 
politics and policy, business and economy, science and technology, military and 
security, health and society, and sports.  
The FWE market shares a similar approach, with an overall objective to 
“advance the science of forecasting, focusing on methods of prediction that rely 
heavily on human judgment.”44 The categories covered in the market include: 
global security, world politics, business and economics, public health, science 
and technology, and culture and social change. Of note, the FWE market runs on 
Inkling Markets software.  
Both markets began in the summer of 2011 and remain open to new 
participants. In order to participate in the Forecasting ACE market you must have 
                                            
42 Adam Siegel, phone conversation with author, March 2012.  
43 Forecasting ACE Beta, “About the Forecasting ACE Site,” accessed May 15, 2012,  
http://forecastingace.com/aces/ about.php. 
44 Forecasting World Events (FWE), “Frequently Asked Questions,” accessed May 15, 2012, 
http://forecastwe.org/faq. 
 19 
a bachelor’s degree or be enrolled in a degree awarding program. The FWE 
market has no such qualification, though the completion of a lengthy pre-study 
questionnaire is required.  
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III.  EXPERIMENTATION / METHODOLOGY 
In order to determine whether prediction markets could be effectively 
employed within a normal military command structure, we set out to design and 
operate several prediction markets within military units. Given that the accuracy 
and mechanics of prediction markets have been widely established, this 
experiment was designed to focus on the implementation of these markets within 
military commands as they have unique organizational and social constructs that 
might challenge the ability to run an efficient prediction market.  
First and foremost, the organizational structure of nearly every military unit 
is a strict hierarchy, with a commanding officer at the top with the ultimate power 
of the final decision in any matters regarding the unit. Second, beyond the 
commander, most units consist of a staff of mid-level officers with whom the 
responsibility for planning and organizing the unit lies. As such, the majority of 
analytical decision-making happens at the top of the hierarchy and involves a 
minority of the unit. A Marine infantry battalion, for example, has nearly 900 
Marines with a staff cadre of just over 20.45  Because of this structure, it is only 
natural to question whether or not this methodology would be welcome in military 
units.   
In our efforts to determine if military units could apply these markets to 
some type of decision-making process, we sought to answer the following 
questions: to what extent would people participate?; what incentives would be 
necessary to encourage their participation?; would commanders be comfortable 
employing this methodology within their commands on issues of importance and 
further, would they use the quantitative results generated by the market? 
Additionally, we considered what types of questions we would need to ask in 
order to maximize participation and how much training would be necessary to 
fully realize the function of the markets. 
                                            
 45 Global Security, “USMC Ground Element: Organization Documents,” accessed May 15, 
2012, http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usmc/to/ground/index.html.  
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Ultimately, five separate prediction markets were designed and operated 
for three unique units. Two of these markets were considered training markets, 
aimed at allowing the participants an opportunity to login to the software and 
practice making trades and leaving comments. The other three markets were 
“real” markets and detailed statistics and information were recorded regarding 
participant activity.  
A. PARTICIPATING UNITS 
The three units chosen to participate in this research were selected based 
on a series of factors that included their potential for representing the widest 
possible application of prediction markets, their willingness to participate, and the 
feasibility of implementing a market within the limitations of a unit’s schedule.   
These markets involved units from a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
experimentation project, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), and the 
Marine Corps’ 2d Intelligence Battalion. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) 
units represent the strategic/operational level and the operational/tactical level. 
Additionally, these units were sufficiently large and diverse enough to provide the 
conditions in order to run a prediction market. Lastly, both of the USMC units are 
intelligence related. These units are responsible for forecasting and providing 
assessments as part of their core responsibilities, and it is possible that their use 
of prediction markets might enhance the quality of their products.  
1. JIFX/TSOA/RELIEF 
The first market was designed to support the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
(NPS) Joint Interagency Field Experimentation (JIFX) 12–2 project that was held 
at the end of February 2012 at Camp Roberts, CA. According to NPS, these 
“field experimentation events have been conducted such that maximum 
innovation and collaboration are encouraged between DoD, government 
agencies, industry, universities, and in which SOF, National Guard, and first 
responder participation and feedback are utilized for effectiveness, affordability, 
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and feasibility of future capabilities.”46 The design for this market was somewhat 
unorthodox given a few critical constraints. The first was the difficulty of soliciting 
volunteers in an environment where potential participants were inundated with a 
variety of requests and demands. The second issue was ensuring that the 
market itself referenced each experiment being tested at the event. This was 
based on the assumption that participation might suffer if a volunteer did not see 
their particular experiment represented in the market. Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, this market would not contain contracts that could be verified by 
actual outcomes. To this point, contracts of this nature have not been studied to 
any great extent and in fact, many purveyors of prediction markets dispute 
whether or not they can be effective in this context. This market would prove to 
be insightful in this regard.  
Ultimately, we ran one prediction market that encompassed 
experimentation from three separate agencies/projects. They were the Adaptive 
Red Team Technical Support and Operational Analysis (ART/TSOA) Activity, the 
Research and Experimentation for Local and International Emergency and First 
Responders (RELIEF), and the Join Interagency Field Experimentation (JIFX) 
event. Each of the three groups listed above were responsible for presenting, 
testing, and evaluating multiple technologies while at Camp Roberts (a detailed 
list of these technologies can be found in Appendix A, Table 8). The JIFX 
attendees consisted of contractors, government civilians, academic and military 
personnel from across the DoD, government agencies, industry, and academia. 
Since we were experimenters ourselves presenting our research at JIFX 12–2, 
we solicited participants for our prediction market from amongst the events’ 
attendees. Ultimately, 47 individuals provided their consent to participate and 30 
were active traders within the market.  
In order to design a prediction market that would work for all three of these 
groups simultaneously, we decided to combine all three of the projects 
                                            
 46 Naval Postgraduate School, “What is JIFX?” accessed May 15, 2012, 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Schools/ GSOIS/Departments/IS/Research/FX/JIFX/JIFX.html.  
 24 
(JIFX/TSOA/RELIEF) into one market with each project the subject of four 
separate contracts. In total, the market consisted of 12 contracts, each with more 
than 15 possible answers. Though the overall number of contracts was 
appropriate for the number of participants, there was concern that the number of 
possible answers for each contract would ultimately affect liquidity. Put another 
way, it was possible that traders would become overwhelmed with the number of 
contracts available, and participation would suffer as a result.  
The contracts asked traders to consider various questions such as:  which 
technology would be present in supply systems in 2015, which were the least 
vulnerable to enemy activity, which deployed with the least amount of gear, and 
which provided the most immediate capability in its present condition (the full text 
of the contracts is available in Appendix A, Table 8). Because this market was 
unique in that the contracts were not exhaustive and exclusive per se, the 
starting price for each selection began at $50.00, and represented the notion that 
each outcome was independent of all other outcomes. In essence,  a trader 
buying shares of one technology would not negatively affect the shares of any 
other technology. At the conclusion of the market, the technologies and their 
potential utility, from any of the four categories could then be ranked as a 
function of their final market price.    
2. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) 
The next two prediction markets were of a less experimental design in that 
the preponderance of contracts were narrowly defined with binary outcomes. 
There were however a small number of contracts that were “open ended” and 
were not tied to verifiable events. The first market was designed for the Marine 
Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) in Quantico, VA.  
MCIA provides tailored intelligence and services to the Marine 
Corps, other services, and the Intelligence Community based on 
expeditionary mission profiles in littoral areas. It supports the 
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development of service doctrine, force structure, training and 
education, and acquisition.47  
Additionally, the unit is manned by active duty and reserve Marines, 
government civilians, and contractors that provide support across the full 
spectrum of intelligence support to operations.  
Support to our prediction market was provided via the Futures Branch of 
the Production and Analysis (P&A) Company and consisted of representation in 
the way of participants from across the P&A Company. Four sections within the 
company provided 10 potential participants as well as five prospective contracts 
for inclusion in the market. From these prospective volunteers, 36 personnel 
agreed to participate and 24 of those ultimately became active participants in the 
market. In addition to the traders, the company also provided eight draft contracts 
which were also included in the market. The scope of the contracts covered 
many different areas, including: the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran, the fate 
of the Syrian president, the likelihood of a North Korean attack on South Korea, 
and the future health of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez among many other 
subjects (for a complete list of contracts see Appendix A, Table 10). In addition, 
contracts regarding pop culture (specifically sports and entertainment) were 
added in order encourage participation. Binary contracts were initially valued at 
$50.00 and contracts with multiple answers with all answers being equal (e.g., 
four answers would each start at $25.00 or five would start at $20.00). Finally, 
this market allowed users to submit their own contracts if they so desired and 
these were edited for clarity and published by the market administrators. 
3. 2d Intelligence Battalion 
The final market in our experimentation was conducted at 2d Intelligence 
Battalion (2d Intel) aboard Camp Lejeune, NC. The mission of 2d Intelligence 
Battalion “is to plan and direct, collect, process, produce, and disseminate 
intelligence and provide counterintelligence support to the Marine Expeditionary 
                                            
47 Marine Corps Base Quantico, “Marine Corps Intelligence Activity,” accessed May 15, 
2012, http://www.quantico. usmc.mil/activities/?Section=MCIA. 
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Force (MEF) Command Element, MEF major subordinate commands, 
subordinate Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), and other commands as 
directed.”48 The Battalion consists of five subordinate companies consisting of a 
Headquarters Company, Counterintelligence / Human Intelligence Company, a 
Production and Analysis Company, a Counterintelligence Support Company, and 
a Production and Analysis Support Company comprising more than 500 Marines. 
The 2d Intel prediction market consisted of 53 consenting participants, all of 
whom were Marines. Of these 53 participants, 42 registered and actively 
participated. The contracts used for this market were the same base contracts for 
the MCIA market. User submitted contracts were allowed (and submitted) in this 
market as well (for a complete list of contracts see Appendix A, Table 12).  
B. MARKET DESIGN 
Given the physical limitations of this research, a software based prediction 
market is without question the most feasible and most efficient method of 
creating the markets proposed above. While there are a variety of potential 
options available to consumers and researchers, one in particular provided the 
greatest accessibility and ease of use. Inkling Markets, based in Chicago, IL, and 
created by CEO Adam Siegel, was “founded in 2006 to offer collective 
intelligence solutions to help organizations decrease operational and strategic 
risk.”49 Since 2006, both civilian industry and government institutions have used 
Inkling Markets, including: Mitre, RAND, Procter and Gamble, Lockheed Martin, 
Ford and many others. Inkling Markets’ software is particularly alluring given its 
ease of use and intuitive design. Utilizing Hanson’s market scoring rules (MSR) 
model, this software is user friendly for both the market creator and market 
participants. Mr. Siegel and Inkling Markets provided the software and necessary 
support pro bono. 
                                            
 48 II Marine Expeditionary Force, “2d Intelligence Battalion Mission,” accessed May 15, 2012, 
http://www.marines. mil/unit/iimef/hq/Pages/2dIntelBN/Mission/default.aspx.  
 49 Inkling, “We Enable Inklings to Happen,” accessed May 15, 2012, http://inklingmarkets. 
com/ homes/company.  
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1. Software Accounts 
Each market was created with the Inkling Markets software and made 
available to participants through their website, www.inklingmarkets.com. Each 
market was created separately in order to partition each unit’s market and to 
ensure the reliability and consistency of the data. Participants were invited to the 
market via the e-mail invite mechanism built into the software. The invite 
consisted of a link to the market where each participant was then prompted to 
create their own user account consisting of a unique (self-made) user ID and 
password. Once they gained access to the website, they were free to begin 
trading. Each trader was granted an initial balance of $5,000.00 play dollars with 
which to buy and sell positions on contracts.  
2. Contracts  
The contracts were a variety of both short term and long term questions 
ranging in lifespan from three days to several months. As a result, some 
contracts would be resolved in a matter of days (e.g., Who will win the baseball 
game between the San Francisco Giants and the Arizona Diamondbacks on 9 
April 2012?), but others might last many months (Will President Obama be 
reelected in November 2012?). In addition, contracts with binary outcomes were 
juxtaposed with those that were open-ended and contained multiple long-term 
possibilities. For example, a binary question might ask “If North Korea will 
successfully launch a satellite by 16 April 2012?” This contract will obviously 
have a “yes” or “no” answer as one or the other has to happen. This contract is 
said to be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, as all possibilities are 
available for purchase. An open ended contract would be phrased: “North Korea 
will conduct a provocative attack on U.S. or South Korean interests within: 0–6 
months, 6–12 months, 12–18 months, North Korea will not commit any attacks.” 
In this case there are multiple answers and any one may be correct. This type of 
question contains an inherent challenge in that the length of the market itself may 
be limited to a timeframe well short of any of the options available. Current 
prediction market research does not address whether or not a participant’s 
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actions will be affected by such a constraint. By designing the market to be a 
contrasting mixture of short-term, long-term, binary, and open-ended contracts, 
one can compare and contrast the trading volume between the various types.  
The type of contract was not the only consideration, however. The number 
of contracts that participants are exposed to can be a critical factor in their 
participation. Our markets were limited to 8–12 contracts in order to encourage 
trading, as a result. In some cases that number was exceeded slightly as a result 
of user submitted contracts.  
3. Market Duration 
Each market was limited in duration based on several factors. The first 
was simply a function of how much time the participating units were willing to 
donate. Understandably, both 2nd Intelligence Battalion and MCIA had a desire to 
limit the market’s timeframe in order to prevent the experiment from adversely 
affecting day-to-day operations within the unit. In addition, evidence suggests 
that one week is ample time for a market to function properly.50  The confluence 
of both of these factors indicated that a market lasting between 7–10 days would 
be the optimal choice.  
4. Training and Test Markets 
The level of training received was also a function of time limitations. In the 
case of the JIFX/TSOA/RELIEF market, on-site training was not possible given 
the participants’ experimental requirements during the week. In many cases, 
participants were conducting very time and energy intensive experiments that did 
not allow for any type of collective training. So participants in this market received 
an overview of the prediction market concept and the software they would be 
interacting with as part of the event’s in-briefing. 2d Intelligence Battalion and 
MCIA, however, did receive a formalized introduction to prediction markets as 
well as a short block of training regarding the use of the software. In these two 
                                            
 50 Plott and Chen, “Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Concept, Design and 
Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem,” 19.   
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cases, participants were exposed to the actual interface and were encouraged to 
ask questions regarding its use. In addition, these two units were encouraged to 
participate in a test-market prior to the actual experimental market. This allowed 
the participant to further acclimatize themselves to the software and ask any 
questions they felt necessary.   
5. Market Incentives 
Conversations with Inkling Markets CEO Adam Siegel revealed that 
effective incentives should go beyond those individuals with the highest account 
balance at the conclusion of the market.51 His opinion, based on observations of 
many different markets, is that rewarding only the wealthiest trader may actually 
de-incentivize those participants who have lost money on various transactions. 
The notion is that once a trader believes they have little to no chance of 
becoming the top trader they limit their participation or quit altogether. As a 
result, this limited participation would have powerful consequences for a market 
that seeks to aggregate information. To combat this, Inkling Markets has 
developed unique mechanisms to reward those that see their account balances 
dwindling. To wit, they have developed “Karma” points that reward users for 
making comments inside the market or for “liking” other traders’ comments. In 
this manner, participants are incentivized to add value to the market despite a 
low portfolio balance. Therefore, we offered prizes in multiple categories: Highest 
Portfolio Balance, Most Trades, and Most Karma Points, believing that the 
“winner” of the market was more than just the participant with the highest 
portfolio value at the end of the day.   
C. POST-MARKET SURVEY 
In an effort to capture the thoughts and opinions of the market 
participants, a short survey was conducted at the completion of each market. The 
survey was designed and operated through free web-based software provided by 
www.surveymonkey.com. Market participants were invited to complete a short 
                                            
51 Adam Siegel, phone conversation with author, March 2012.  
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survey via an e-mail invite. As such, each survey was anonymous and no 
information was recorded regarding who had, or had not completed the survey.  
The survey consisted of ten questions regarding general demographic 
data and basic market behavior questions.52  The demographic data requested 
was “Rank/Pay Grade” and “Education Level.” This data was sought in an effort 
to understand the basic attributes of the average participant and potentially 
highlight a variable that would indicate whether or not experience or education 
had any effect on market participation. Market behavior questions were asked in 
order to determine the number of times an individual logged into the market and 
the extent to which a participant traded during each visit. Additionally, the survey 
attempted to clearly define and catalog a volunteer’s logic for participating, or 
choosing not to participate at a given time, and whether or not they felt compelled 
to conduct additional research to aid in their trading efforts. Finally, the survey 
posed questions regarding the respondent’s desire to participate in another such 
market, and queried them for potential future applications of prediction markets 
within the military.    
                                            
52 See Appendix B for a copy of the survey and results.  
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. OVERALL  
We conducted five prediction markets over the course of two months. Two 
of the markets were training markets, designed to familiarize the participant with 
the market software, while the other three were the experimental markets that 
functioned as the basis of our research. Site visits and command briefings were 
conducted in late February and early March 2012 and were intended to inform 
the command of our processes and procedures, as well as to solicit additional 
support. The markets were initiated during the second week of March and were 
concluded 21 days later. The initial design and implementation of all three 
markets were conducted on site with the participating unit, while the actual 
market administration was performed remotely from the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) via the Internet. The entire experimentation phase consisted of 136 
participants who made more than 1200 trades consisting of more than 18,000 
shares and nearly $800,000 in play money over 23 days (see Table 1).  
 





JIFX 47 381 13 3553 $189,487.90 
MCIA 36 342 13 2414 $93,466.73 
2d Intel 53 660 19 12576 $514,599.97 
Totals 136 1383 45 18,543 $797,554.60 




B. MARKET DESIGN 
Each experimental market was initially intended to include ten contracts 
that would each run for five to seven days. However, as each market was 
designed, care was taken to ensure that the content of the market and focus of 
the contracts was valuable and relevant to the participating unit. As such, the 
Joint Interagency Field Experimentation (JIFX) project market focused solely on 
content relevant to the JIFX. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) and 
2d Intelligence Battalion markets also included other contracts outside the normal 
interest of military units at the behest of both the market administrators and the 
experimenting units. These other contracts related to sports, entertainment and 
politics were included to determine whether or not traders would invest in these 
contracts more heavily and thereby “prime the pump” for trading in more 
occupation-relevant contracts. We believed that some may not be immediately 
interested in the prediction market concept or the questions being asked. 
Therefore, offering other general knowledge questions as contracts might serve 
to pique the interest of these traders and encourage them to participate in the 
main market contracts.  
1. Length of Contracts  
Each market conducted during the experimentation phase consisted of 
13–19 contracts and lasted between five and nine days (see Table 2). These 
contracts were a mix of unit-created, market-administrator created, and user-
created, and covered a wide range of topics related to each market.53 The JIFX 
market contracts focused primarily on the viability of various experiments and 
technologies that were viewed by market participants during JIFX 12–2. The 
constrained timeline of this market was a function of the sponsoring event and as 
a result the market was opened to traders for only one week.  
 
 
                                            
53 See Appendix A for detailed contracts and market statistics. 
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Table 2.   Basic market data 
The MCIA market contracts consisted largely of questions related to 
current and future world events, foreign policy questions, and included two “pop 
culture” questions.54 After some discussion with unit participants, we determined 
that a familiarization market would be conducted prior to the establishment of the 
experimental market so as to condition traders to the market framework and the 
functionality of the software. Therefore, the length of the familiarization market 
and MCIA experimental market was three and eight days, respectively.  
The 2d Intelligence Battalion market contained the most contracts at 19 
and also covered the most ground topically, with seven sports and entertainment 
related contracts, ten world events contracts, and two political contracts.55 Like 
the MCIA market, a three day familiarization market was established prior to the 
nine day experimental market.   
2. Participants 
Across all three markets, there was a 71% participation level among 
consenting participants. Put another way, of 136 users who consented to 
participate and were subsequently invited, 96 users actually registered for a user 
account. Of the three markets, the 2d Intelligence Battalion market had the 
highest level of user participation at 79% registered, while the JIFX market had 
the least at 64% (see Figure 1). Of note though, both the 2d Intelligence Battalion 
and MCIA markets were homogenous units while the JIFX market consisted 
primarily of users who were independent of the JIFX event. In essence, few of 
                                            
54 See Appendix A, Table 10. 
55 See Appendix A, Table 12. 
 JIFX MCIA 2d Intel 
Number of Participants 47 36 53 
Number of Contracts 13 13 19 
Length of Market 5 Days 8 Days 9 Days 
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the JIFX market participants had any real stake in the outcome of the market, 
though 64% of invited users still registered for an account and conducted trades.  
 
  
Figure 1.   Total account registration rate by market 
3. Participant Demographics 
The demographic data of market participants across the three units varied 
widely, ranging from independent and government contractors, to enlisted and 
officer service members (see Figure 2). As might be expected, the majority of the 
contractors came from the JIFX market, while the bulk of the enlisted service 


























Figure 2.   Rank/Pay Grade of market participants, all markets 
This demographic divide can also be seen on the educational side as the 
majority of college graduates were represented in the JIFX and MCIA markets. 
Additionally, the JIFX market also reflected the highest number of users with 
advanced degrees. Overall, survey respondents overwhelmingly reported some 
level of college completed.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Education level of participants, all markets 
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4. Incentives Offered 
For each market, incentives were offered in order to entice people to 
participate. These incentives were materially insignificant in nature, ranging from 
a $20 gift card to a 72-hour liberty pass for the market winners.56 The gift cards 
were awarded by the market administrators, while the liberty passes were unit 
specific to 2d Intelligence Battalion. As discussed in the previous chapter, we felt 
that incentives were a necessary condition in order to ensure maximum 
participation and so market winners were defined in multiple categories: overall 
highest portfolio value, highest number of trades, and most karma points.   
5. Participant Behavior  
Across the three prediction markets, 45% of traders logged on less than 
five times during the course of the market (see Figure 4). This number is 
somewhat skewed though as 80% of the JIFX market participants logged on less 
than five times (see Table 3). The reason for the high percentage of low logins in 
the JIFX market is likely due to the nature of the contracts. As designed, these 
contracts did not necessarily lend themselves to support a large volume of trades 
as they asked about an outcome that was attributed to a one-time event. 
Regardless of this statistic, 78% of all market participants logged on less than ten 
times.   
                                            
56 A 72-hour liberty pass is an incentive used by military commanders at the unit level to 
reward their soldiers/Marines. A 72-hour liberty pass is normally a 3-day weekend with travel 
limited to the local area.  
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None 0% 0% 7% 
Less than 5 40% 20% 80% 
6–10 33% 60% 0% 
11–20 17% 13% 7% 
More than 
20 10% 7% 7% 
Table 3.   Logins by market 
In terms of total amount of time spent per trader-login, the majority of 
participants spent three to five minutes per visit, with 75% of total participants 
spending less than 10 minutes per site visit (see Figure 5). Interestingly, when 
examined by market, all three exhibited similar behavior regarding the ratio of 
participants to the time that they spent per visit (see Table 4). 
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Less than 3 
minutes 10% 7% 20% 
3–5 minutes 30% 40% 40% 
6–10 minutes 30% 27% 27% 
More than 10 
minutes 30% 27% 13% 
Table 4.   Time spent per visit 
All three markets exhibited the highest volume of trading during the first 
four days and afterwards exhibited a precipitous downward trend, with none of 
the markets demonstrating any significant trading activity after day five (see 
Figure 6). Of note, the decreased trading in the MCIA market during days two 
and three is likely explained by a command-wide Internet outage during this 
period. Also telling is Figure 7, which shows that 66% of market participants 
made less than 10 trades and 88% made less than 30 total trades.  
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To better understand the individual reasoning behind participant behavior, 
every market trader was invited to participate in a post-market survey where they 
were queried about their experience while a participant. Respondents to the 
question, “What was the biggest factor in your decision not to participate at a 
given moment?” predominantly answered, “lack of time” (see Figure 8). 
Additionally, several of the comments posted to the “Other” category could also 
be classified as belonging to the “lack of time” category. Other major reasons 
cited for not participating was due to a lack of knowledge, or interest in the 
questions being asked.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Reasons for not participating, all markets  
Reasons for not participating by market can be further expounded by the 
makeup of the unit and their responses. For example, MCIA shows that 27% of 
respondents had no knowledge of the questions being asked (see Table 5). This 
is likely due to the specificity involved in the contract design at the behest of the 
unit. MCIA is broken down into functional areas, so respondents from a functional 
area that falls outside the subject matter of the contract would likely not feel that 
they had the expertise to offer a response to that contract. The same is true of 
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the JIFX market where unless the participant was available for all three phases of 
the JIFX exercise, they would most likely not have any valuable input to the other 























Lack of time 37% 47% 60% 
Lack of know how (in regards to using the 
market) 3% 0% 0% 
A belief that your input does not matter 7% 0% 0% 
No interest in the questions being asked 13% 13% 0% 
No knowledge of the questions being asked 13% 27% 20% 
Other (please specify) 27% 13% 20% 
Table 5.   Reasons for not participating, all markets 
When asked what the major factor was in their decision to participate, 
57% of all survey respondents answered “intrigue in prediction markets.” Only 
20% of the total respondents answered that incentives, or the chance to win 
prizes, was the major factor, with the majority of that 20% belonging to the 2d 
Intelligence Battalion market (see Figure 9). However, in the 2d Intelligence 
Battalion market, incentives were cited by 33% of the respondents as being 
important, suggesting that while incentives don’t seem to matter across the 
board, they may be important to certain demographics or commands.  
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Figure 9.   Factors that influenced participation, all markets  
6. Command Involvement 
Finally, the level of command involvement seen in the three prediction 
markets covered the spectrum from fully interested and involved, to tacit approval 
with no direct participation. Interestingly, command involvement seemed to have 
little overall influence in regards to market activity; however, it did seem to factor 
into individual reasoning for participating. For example, the JIFX market had no 
command involvement to speak of and survey respondents noted this, with only 
7% citing management influence as a reason for participating. On the other hand, 
33% cited management influence in the 2d Intelligence Battalion market which 
had the most direct command involvement with the Commanding Officer 
participating and personally providing incentives in the form of a 72 hour liberty 
pass to the market winner. MCIA had indirect command involvement with the 
Commanding Officer aware of the market, but not participating, though 27% still 
noted management influence as a reason for participating.  
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C. RESULTS BY MARKET 
1. JIFX/TSOA/RELIEF 
This market was set up to gauge the overall utility and usability of 
experiments presented at JIFX 12–2 in their use to the U.S. military, specifically 
U.S. Special Operations Command. The JIFX organization has long used a 
checklist for evaluators to judge the applicability, utility and usefulness of 
experiments presented. While adequate for their purposes, we proposed that a 
prediction market might provide a more objective approach to this historically 
subjective process. Over the course of five days, the market resulted in 381 
trades by 30 active traders consisting of 3,553 shares and nearly $190,000 in 
“play” money. 
a. Market Design 
The JIFX market is undeniably unique in its design. As the field 
experiment actually consisted of three separate areas of research, we 
determined that the market must contain contracts that not only represented 
each of these areas, but each individual experiment as well. With this construct in 
mind, the JIFX market was based on four core questions that related well to each 
area of experimentation and would elicit the type of information that the JIFX 
administrators were interested in collecting. Subsequently, each of these four 
questions was assigned to one of three areas of experimentation resulting in 12 
core market questions (four TSOA, four JIFX and four RELIEF) in total. Each 
experiment was then added as a potential answer for each contract meaning that 




Figure 10.   Example of a JIFX market contract. This picture shows the multiple 
sub-answers available to the trader 
Pragmatically, the unorthodox design of this market posed serious 
challenges in terms of generating adequate market liquidity. Stated more simply, 
the participants might find themselves overwhelmed by the choices available and 
become reluctant to trade. In actuality, this concern was not without merit in the 
JIFX and RELIEF contracts where there were fewer traders; however, the TSOA 
contracts were subject to a much higher trading volume, suggesting that a 
contract with a number of “sub-answers” is viable if supported by adequate 
participation. Additionally, prediction markets have not been adequately tested in 
this context and this experiment represents an entirely new application. In point 
of fact, our expectations for the success of this market were decidedly low and 
we approached this particular market with guarded optimism knowing that 
stagnant market (representing total failure) was entirely possible, if not likely. 
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b. Length of Contracts  
The nature of the exercise and the operational tempo of the 
participants limited the market duration to one-week. Additionally, it was 
determined that one-week was adequate to garner the participation necessary 
without becoming overly burdensome to the participants.    
 
 Averages (per 
contract) 
Totals 
Number of Traders 6.92 47 
Number of Trades 29.31 381 
Number of Contracts -- 13 
Table 6.   JIFX/TSOA/RELIEF basic market statistics 
c. Participants 
Participation in the market was sought via face-to-face solicitation 
with an e-mail that included links to register and create a user account. Overall, 
271 individuals were contacted and invited, with 47 consenting to participate and 
30 ultimately registering for an account. This result far succeeded initial 
expectations.  
At the conclusion of the market, the 47 consenting participants 
were also sent a request to participate in a post-market survey regarding their 
experiences as a trader. Of those invited, 32% completed the survey. Sixty-
seven percent of the survey respondents were civilian contractors whose 
business is research and design, hence their inclusion and participation in the 
JIFX event.57 Additionally, many of the market participants were academics or 
involved with academia, which likely justifies their willingness to participate in 
such a market. In terms of education, all market participants reported that they 
had a bachelor’s degree or higher, with 73% reporting that they had a master’s 
degree or higher.58  
                                            
57 See Appendix B, Figure 43. 
58 See Appendix B, Figure 44.  
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d. Incentives Offered 
The only incentive offered to market participants was a gift 
certificate to the outright market winner, suggesting that since the 
experimentation occurred in California wine country, perhaps they could 
purchase a fine case of wine. According to the post-market survey, only 3% 
responded that they were influenced by incentives as a reason for participating. 
Most participated due to an intrigue in prediction markets (37%), while others 
noted an interest in the ability to provide opinions in a non-confrontational forum 
(23%).59   
e. Participant Behavior  
According to survey results, 80% of the market participants logged 
on less than five times during the course of the week, and the majority spent 3–5 
minutes on average inside the market per visit.60  When asked about “the biggest 
factor in your decision NOT to participate at a given moment,” survey 
respondents overwhelmingly noted that a “lack of time” was the largest inhibitor. 
The next most common response was a “lack of knowledge regarding the 
questions being asked.”61   
Trading patterns across the market reflected participants’ inclination 
to trade within markets that they had personal experience with and to avoid the 
markets that were outside of their professional purview. The majority of trades 
were conducted on the second day of the market and trading dropped off 
significantly after the fourth day of the market (see Figure 11).  
 
                                            
59 See Appendix B, Figure 49. 
60 See Appendix B, Figures 45 and 46. 
61 See Appendix B, Figure 47. 
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Figure 11.   Total trades by day, JIFX market 
It also appears from the data that generally, participants only traded 
once per contract and did not totally take advantage of the market mechanism 
(meaning trades were never revisited to judge true value of the answer chosen). 
Another interesting and encouraging part of this market was the amount and 
quality of comments inside the market. On average, each contract had six 
comments, with one TSOA contract regarding which “technology provided the 
most immediate capability for force protection,” having 40 comments amongst 13 
traders.62 In total, 79% of the market participants made less than 10 trades, with 
17% of the traders accounting for 80% of the trades (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12.   JIFX market trades by user 
f. Command Involvement 
Per se, there was no real command involvement for this market. 
The permission to participate was given by the head of the JIFX team as a result 
of the program’s relationship with NPS. While the project head was not involved 
directly, the head of the TSOA team did support and encourage his personnel 
(the evaluators) to participate in the market.  
2. MCIA 
The MCIA market was designed to test the implementation of a prediction 
market as a potential intelligence forecasting tool. The market participants were 
all members of the command and consisted of uniformed military and civilians. 
Our purpose was to evaluate whether or not military intelligence professionals 
are capable of implementing this methodology in their forecasts and whether or 
not the information garnered was practical or desired by decision makers. Over 
the course of eight days, the market resulted in 342 trades by 24 active traders 
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a. Market Design 
The design of the MCIA market was undertaken in close 
coordination with the Futures Branch of the Production and Analysis (P&A) 
Company. The desire of both the researcher and the experimenting unit was to 
ensure that the market contracts were interesting and useful to the command and 
by extension, the market participants. To that end, MCIA requested that each 
interested section within the command submit questions that they would like to 
see considered for inclusion in the market. This solicitation resulted in ten 
contracts which were then refined and included in the market. Additionally, the 
researchers added two sports related questions and a participant submitted one 
contract for inclusion.  
b. Length of Contracts  
The MCIA market was originally projected to run for one week; 
however, due to an unscheduled Internet outage at the command during the first 
five days, the market was extended into the next week to allow those that wanted 
to trade an opportunity to do so. The market was also preceded by a three-day 
familiarization market to allow the prospective participants an opportunity to “test 
drive” the software before actual market began.   
 
 Averages (per 
contract) 
Totals 
Number of Traders 13 36 
Number of Trades 26.31 342 
Number of Contracts -- 13 
Table 7.   MCIA basic market statistics 
c. Participants 
The initial solicitation for participants was done by the command 
prior to the initial command in-brief by the researchers. Those who desired to 
participate were then asked to attend a briefing that covered the basics of 
prediction markets and the scope of our research, as well as a brief overview of 
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the Inkling Markets software. At the conclusion of this briefing, participants 
signed an informed consent and provided their contact information so that they 
could receive their formal market invitation. Ultimately, 36 individuals consented 
to participate, with 24 registering for an account.  
Forty-two percent of the market participants also participated in a 
post-market survey. Of those that completed the survey questionnaire, 53% were 
uniformed military and 43% were government civilians.63 Educationally, all 
market participants reported that they had some college, with 53% reporting that 
they had a bachelor’s degree, and 20% reporting a master’s degree.64  
d. Incentives Offered 
Incentives in the way of gift cards were offered to the market 
winners. For this market, participants were informed that there would be three 
winners; one each for “highest portfolio value,” “most number of trades,” and 
“most karma points.” According to the post-market survey, only 3% responded 
that they participated due to the chance to win prizes. Most participated due to an 
“intrigue in prediction markets” (27%) or due to the “interesting or relevant” 
questions (23%).65  Another 27% noted that they felt some “management 
influence” to participate. This influence is likely due to the command’s request for 
each section to provide both potential contracts and interested participants. 
e. Participant Behavior  
According to survey results, 60% of the market participants logged 
on six to ten times during the course of the week, and the majority spent 3–5 
minutes on average inside the market per visit.66  When asked about, “the 
biggest factor in your decision NOT to participate at a given moment,” 47% 
                                            
63 See Appendix B, Figure 53. 
64 See Appendix B, Figure 54. 
65 See Appendix B, Figure 59. 
66 See Appendix B, Figures 55 and 56. 
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responded that a “lack of time” was the largest inhibitor, while 27% noted a “lack 
of knowledge regarding the questions being asked.”67  
As with the JIFX market, the trading patterns across the market 
reflected that participants mainly traded widely on the contracts with which they 
were most familiar, and that on average, they only bought one position per 
contract. The majority of trades were conducted on the fourth day of the market 
as trading days two and three were statistically irrelevant given a command-wide 
Internet outage. (see Figure 13). Also like the JIFX market, the volume of trades 
dropped significantly after the fourth day.  
 
 
Figure 13.   MCIA total trades by contract 
Comments throughout the market were sparse. We did not 
anticipate this result, as one of the anticipated benefits for analysts using 
prediction markets is the ability to use the forums to generate dialogue 
concerning forecasts or assessments. The most widely traded contracts were 
ones concerning the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iran or a North Korean 
attack on South Korea which resulted in 47 and 51 trades, respectively.68 It is 
                                            
67 See Appendix B, figure 57. 
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also apparent from the market data that questions that involved little expert 
knowledge or might be perceived as normal “common knowledge” received the 
most activity. This result is in keeping with the lack of time response above, as 
specialized questions would likely require some degree of research if the trader 
is not a subject matter expert. Overall, 64% of the market participants made less 




Figure 14.   MCIA trades by user 
f. Command Involvement 
The MCIA Commander gave tacit approval for this market, but was 
not himself an active participant. Instead, the Production and Analysis Company 
Commander was given overall cognizance of the project, with his Futures Branch 
Officer in Charge managing the hands-on setup and implementation of the 
market. As such, MCIA unit members were encouraged to participate but were 
not required to participate.  
3. 2d Intelligence Battalion 
The 2d Intelligence Battalion market was the only completely military 
market that we ran during our experimentation.  Further, this market was the only 
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2d Intelligence Battalion focuses its intelligence support at the operational level of 
command and had recently returned from a yearlong deployment to Afghanistan. 
After discussions with the command Operations Officer, it was determined that 
the 2d Intelligence Market would mirror the MCIA market contracts with only a 
few exceptions. Another unique aspect of this market was the makeup of the 
participants, with nearly 60% of the participants enlisted service members below 
the rank of Sergeant (E-5). Over the course of nine days, the market resulted in 
660 trades by 42 active traders consisting of more than 12,000 shares and 
$515,000 in “play” money. 
a. Market Design 
As stated above, the design of the 2d Intelligence Battalion market 
was based on the MCIA market discussed previously, with three notable 
exceptions. First, some of the very specific contracts, such as the drug trade in 
South America or the Islamist movement Boko Haram in Nigeria were dropped 
since they had little relevance to the mission of 2d Intelligence 
Battalion.  Second, the battalion commander asked for the inclusion of certain 
contracts as a way to discern the opinions of his Marines on local issues such as 
local gas prices.  Finally, given that the demographics of the market were heavily 
weighted toward the junior enlisted, we felt that more pop-culture contracts would 
be needed in order to stimulate trading on the more operationally relevant 
contracts. One of the unintended consequences of this was that users focused a 
great deal of attention on these contracts instead of those that would be of actual 
interest to the command. This also led to minor saturation of the market with 
contracts that were not necessarily command focused.  
b. Length of Contracts  
Similar to the MCIA market, the 2d Intelligence market was 
projected to run for one week following a three-day familiarization market. While 
trading volume was the highest on day three, the registration rate was not. One 
potential explanation for the initial lull in registration was the high turnover rate 
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facing the unit due to planned separations and the granting of leave requests 
given their recent return from their deployment to Afghanistan. In light of this, the 
decision was made to extend the market past the weekend to allow extra time for 
those who desired to participate but had not yet had an opportunity to do so. 
Also, since several of the contracts were user-submitted, some were not created 
and able to be traded until later in the week, reducing the likelihood of a high 
volume of trading. Ultimately, the entire market was capped at nine days in 
keeping with our initial desire to keep the markets short in overall duration.  
 
 Averages (per 
contract) 
Totals 
Number of Traders 14.16 53 
Number of Trades 34.74 660 
Number of Contracts -- 19 
Table 8.   2d Intelligence Battalion basic market statistics 
c. Participants 
To garner participation in the market, we traveled to Camp Lejeune 
to brief unit leadership and command personnel on our research goals and 
proposed market framework. We briefed our project three times; once to the 
Commanding Officer and his Staff, and twice to separate groups of unit analysts. 
Through these face-to-face iterations, we were able to gain the consent of 53 
individuals to participate. Of those 53, 42 registered for an account and made at 
least one trade.   
Of the 53 participants, 57% also completed the post market survey. 
Of the surveyed participants, 60% were enlisted service members in the grade of 
E-5 or below.69 In total, 80% of the participants were enlisted, while 39% of 
survey respondents would be classified as serving in a leadership role (E-6 or 
                                            
69 See Appendix B, Figure 63. 
 55 
higher). Seventy-three percent of those surveyed reported that they had “some 
college,” with 17% having a bachelor’s degree and 7% with a master’s degree.70  
d. Incentives Offered 
Initially, our projections for participation levels within this market 
were very optimistic and based on two lines of reasoning. The first is that this 
type of technology appeals to a younger demographic in its design and function, 
and generally ignites a spirit of competition. The second is that anecdotal 
discussions with participants indicated a desire to provide input and opinion in a 
non-confrontational and non-attributable manner. Additionally, we felt that 
incentives might further their desire to contribute, so the Battalion Commanding 
Officer personally offered the winner of the market a 72-hour liberty pass. As with 
the MCIA market, winners were determined by overall portfolio worth, most 
trades made, and most karma points.  
While post market survey data for the JIFX and MCIA markets 
revealed that only 3% of those who completed the post-market survey 
participated for the chance to win prizes (incentives), 33% of the 2d Intelligence 
Battalion traders who were surveyed participated for incentives.71 Admittedly 
however, the chance to win time off from work may be more valued than the 
chance for a gift card or case of wine.   
e. Participant Behavior  
Across the nine-day market, survey results indicate that 40% 
logged on less than five times, with 73% ultimately logging on less than 10 times. 
A participants’ time per visit was evenly divided across the choices, with 30% 
falling to 3–5 minutes, 6–10 minutes and more than 10 minutes respectively, and 
10% reporting that they spent less than five minutes per visit. Similar to the JIFX 
and MCIA markets, the 2d Intelligence Battalion survey respondents cited a lack 
                                            
70 See Appendix B, Figure 64. 
71 See Appendix B, Figure 69. 
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of time as their number one reason for not participating “at a given moment.” This 
is significant, as in this market, the Commanding Officer gave his explicit 
permission for participants to trade in the market during working hours. The next 
most common responses were a “lack of knowledge” or a “lack of interest in the 
question.”72   
The highest volume of trading in the market occurred on days three 
and eight (see Figure 15). As discussed above, registration was slow initially as 
many unit personnel had been granted a long weekend prior to market initiation. 
The higher volume of trading on day eight is likely a function of participants 
returning from block leave.  Participants in this market appeared reticent to trade 
a contract more than once or twice. Additionally, since the traders were only 
granted $5,000 with which to begin trading, many appeared to spread their 
money out across several contracts.  
 
 
Figure 15.   Total trades by contract, by day 
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On average, each trader made just over two trades per contract 
and each contract averaged about 14 traders per. The two most popular 
contracts by number of traders both had to do with politics, one regarding the 
Louisiana Republican Presidential Primary and the other concerning the 
likelihood of President Obama being reelected. The most heavily traded contract 
in the market asked about the team that was the most likely to win the 2012 
Division I NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship (March Madness). In total, 58% 
of the market participants made less than 10 trades, with 26% of the traders 
accounting for 79% of the trades (see Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 16.   2d Intelligence Battalion market trades by user 
f. Command Involvement 
This market had the most command involvement of the three 
commands. The Battalion Commander was personally involved and highly 
interested in the results of the experiment as he felt that his analysts could 
employ prediction markets as an analytic tool.73 From the planning stages, 
through market design, and into implementation, the Commander was an active 
participant and vocal supporter, even going so far as to personally guarantee 
                                            
73 Conversation with LtCol Joe Gross, Commanding Officer of 2d Intelligence Battalion, 
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incentives to the winners of his market. The most obvious results of command 
involvement seems to be a high participation rate at 79% and 1/3 of survey 
respondents who answered that “management influence” was one of their main 
reasons for participating in the market.74 This management influence is not 
necessarily a pejorative concept however as the 2d Intelligence Battalion market 
boasted the most participants, the highest registration rate, and the second 
highest trade per user rate. This is significant in that it clearly illustrates the 
notion that market success is dependent upon the active attention and 
participation of command leadership. 
  
                                            
74 See Appendix B, Figure 69.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
In totality, the data gathered not only serves to answer the research 
questions posed, but it also provides a number of potential recommendations for 
prediction market implementation in military commands as well as a foundation 
for future research. The conclusions drawn serve as a valid point of departure for 
designing future markets to be both relevant and useful for the unit that chooses 
to employ them. By analyzing the trading activity of the three markets and the 
post-market survey responses detailed in the previous chapter, we were able to 
draw a fair number of conclusions and provide answers to our research 
questions. 
A. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the Features of Market Design that Might Encourage 
Participation in/from Military Units/Individuals? 
Participation is without question the single most important factor in 
determining the utility of any given prediction market, because a prediction 
market simply will not work without participation from traders. The intuitive nature 
of this statement does not detract from its importance. As such, our research 
provided a wide variety of incentives, while also evaluating their efficacy. While it 
is generally agreed upon that there must be an incentive structure to encourage 
trading, there has been a dearth of research that compared the tangible 
incentives of money or prizes to the intangible motivation of personal interest and 
prestige. Our findings indicate that tangible incentives play far less of a role than 
previously thought. 
In addition to specifying evidence of the aforementioned uninteresting 
factors, the answers that the survey respondents provided also allow onte to see 
what factors encourage participation amongst traders. While the primary reason 
of “Intrique in Prediction Markets” has already been mentioned, the survery 
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confirms that “competition,” “relevant/interesting questions,” and the “ability to 
provide an opinion in a non-confrontational forum” also play an enormous role in 
a trader’s participation calculus.  
The three markets employed two different types of incentive prizes in the 
same three categories. The JIFX and MCIA markets rewarded selected 
participants with a twenty-dollar gift card, while the 2d Intelligence Battalion 
market used free vacation days as an incentive. The decision to use liberty 
passes in lieu of gift cards was suggested by the Battalion Commander. This was 
fortuitous as it created the opportunity to test the efficacy of a socially acceptable, 
legal reward within a military system, and it also established the precedence for 
an incentive that could be continued post-experiment should the unit decide to 
continue using prediction markets as an analytic tool. 
From an anecdotal perspective, it seemed clear during the initial briefings 
to the participants that the incentives provided were going to play a major role in 
the individuals’ decision to participate. Participants’ body language (consisting of 
approving smiles, head nods and chatter about how to spend the money) when 
the gift cards and liberty passes were mentioned seemed to indicate that a 
greater than normal rate of participation would be likely. However, the rates of 
participation in these three prediction markets were not significantly higher than 
what is typical for a market of this size (i.e., 20 percent of the traders making 
80 percent of the trades). Furthermore the preponderance of the evidence 
provided by the survey indicates that in each market, “Intrigue in the Market” was 
the primary reason for initial participation.75  In point of fact, “Incentives (the 
chance to win prizes)” was one of the least selected responses, accounting for 
only 20% of the total, though 17% of those were from the 2d Intelligence 
Battalion market.76   
                                            
75 See Appendix B, Figure 39. 
76 See Appendix B, Figures 39 and 69. 
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This finding is especially important to military units, since the concern 
regarding military use of prediction markets has been heretofore articulated as a 
“disdain for gambling.”  In addition, conversations with some commanders have 
indicated concern that they cannot legally provide tangible incentives such as gift 
cards. Our findings essentially remove both of these issues from debate given 
that tangible prizes were a relatively uninteresting factor for most participants. 
2. What Market Attributes are Useful for Military Decision 
(Prediction) Markets (Number and Type of Contracts, Length of 
Market)? 
In addition to answering questions of incentives, the three experimental 
markets also provided a great deal of insight into type of contracts that traders 
were most interested in and the duration of such interest. Both the 2d Intelligence 
Battalion and MCIA markets were designed to include general interest contracts 
that allowed the participants to make predictions on sports and pop-culture. This 
was done to encourage a greater degree of liquidity in the market and to “prime 
the pump” of trader interest in the market. The JIFX market served as a control 
for this variable as their market did not have any contracts that were not directly 
related to the experiments conducted at the field exercise. A comparison of the 
three markets with regards to the type of contracts is telling. 
In both the MCIA and 2d Intelligence Battalion markets, the average 
number of trades per participant were 2.03 and 2.29, respectively.77  However, in 
the JIFX market, which did not include “priming” questions of any kind, the 
average number of trades per participant was 3.35, representing a 40% increase 
in trading activity. This increase, taken with the survey responses that indicate 
the importance of “relevant/interesting questions” is powerful evidence that a 
critically important factor in the success of a contract is the relevance to the user. 
Put another way, using easy to grasp, general knowledge questions does not 
appear to serve as a pathway for participants to trade on more complex 
                                            
77 The slightly higher average of the 2d Intel market is likely the result of the enormous 
amount of trading that resulted from a contract regarding the winner of the 2012 NCAA Men’s 
Basketball tournament. 
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contracts. Overall, the evidence indicates that the single most effective method of 
inducing trading activity on a particular contract is to craft questions that will be 
relevant to the market participants.  
The interest of a particular user however only seems to run so far. Despite 
the difference in demographics among the three markets there was one very 
clear constant between them: each one of the markets saw a substantial 
decrease in activity after the fourth day of trading. Furthermore, participation was 
almost entirely absent after the fifth day of trading (see Figure 17).  
 
 
Figure 17.   Trading volume across all markets (first five days) 
This finding is noteworthy in two respects. The first is that it supports 
Slamka et al.’s claim that second-generation payoff mechanisms such as final 
stock price do not induce massive herding or manipulative behavior towards the 
end of a known trading period.78  The second is that it suggests a point of 
diminishing returns on trading volume for markets of this type. Taken together, 
these points suggest an appropriate timeframe and payoff mechanism for a 
military market creator. A market with clearly defined contracts that last no more 
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than a week appear to be just as effective as those that last much longer. 
Additionally, our research shows that even if traders know when a contract will 
end, it has little to no effect on the ultimate contract price, suggesting that at least 
in these markets, herding was not a factor.  
3. How Might a Military Unit Employ Prediction Markets and what 
Types of Units Might Find Prediction Markets Useful? 
In order to answer this two-part question appropriately, one must first 
discuss the attributes of the three separate test markets. With this in mind, the 2d 
Intelligence Battalion and MCIA test markets were essentially forecast markets, 
which, if employed in an actual scenario, would create a series of quantitative 
forecasts regarding future events. In an entirely different application, the JIFX 
market functioned as “an idea market”79 designed to evaluate new product ideas. 
Understanding the division between these markets is an essential part of 
understanding what types of units might stand to benefit the most from the 
employment of a prediction market. 
In the case of a forecast market, the intelligence units that participated in 
the experiment would be an intriguing place to employ a series of markets. 
Forecasts are a critical part of the intelligence process but are generally the 
product of a single mind or perhaps a consensus from self-proclaimed subject 
matter experts. Additionally, well over half of the participants from these two 
markets indicated that they conducted additional research as a result of their 
participation in the market.80  This fact, along with the responses that indicated a 
desire to “provide information in a non-confrontational forum” is strong evidence 
that an intelligence organization of a similar type could stand to benefit a great 
deal both in terms of refined forecasting and increased incentive for the 
participant to increase their base of knowledge regarding potential analytic 
judgments. 
                                            
79 Slamka, Jank, and Skiera, “Second-Generation Prediction Markets,” 1. 
80 See Appendix B, Figures 58 and 68. 
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Alternatively, the JIFX market functioned effectively in an entirely different 
way. Despite the lack of actual event payoffs, this market did not see a 
substantial drop in trading activity and was actually very successful in terms of its 
participation rates. Both the trading activity and survey responses supported the 
notion that traders were not discouraged from participating despite the fact that 
their contracts would not be settled on the basis of actual future events. In short, 
traders felt free to express their evaluation without regard to some kind of 
guaranteed payoff. In terms of potential applications, this could lead one to see 
the JIFX market as an analogue for a military acquisition unit designed to 
evaluate equipment for future employment.   
Extrapolating from this, there are a variety of units that could stand to 
benefit a great deal from employing a market of this type. For instance, the 2nd 
Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 1st Armored Division at Fort Bliss, Texas, which 
took over the role of the Army Evaluation Task Force in late 2010 and which has 
been asked to test and evaluate equipment for future employment on the 
battlefield81, could find a prediction market both useful and efficient. As an 
example, 2BCT could establish a prediction market post-training event, ask a 
series of questions regarding the tested equipment and aggregate the opinions of 
the entire Brigade in relatively short order, while gathering results in an objective 
and quantifiable manner rather than as a subjective assessment.  
4. What are the Challenges Associated with the use of Prediction 
Markets in Military Decision-Making? 
Whenever an attempt is made to introduce and integrate a new tool into a 
military unit there are always challenges. Prediction markets are unlikely to be 
immune from such challenges. The impediments to implementation are various, 
ranging from the logistical to the intangible, but the major barriers are not 
impossible to overcome. 
                                            
81 John Hall, “Fort Bliss Unit Changes Command, Takes on Systems-Testing Mission,” El 
Paso Times, November 17, 2010, accessed May 31, 2012, http://www.elpasotimes. 
com/news/ci_16631304?IADID=Search-www.elpasotimes.com-www.elpasotimes.com. 
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First and foremost prediction markets are largely a software-based 
application. It is not outside the realm of possibility that a member of the unit 
could create an application of their own volition, but this is extremely unlikely. 
Therefore, a unit would need to purchase the license for a software application 
from a company such as Inklingmarkets.com, as well as provide traders with a 
means of access to the trading instrument, e.g., a computer terminal. Though an 
analysis of this cost compared with the cost of current evaluation methods is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is conceivable that the use of prediction 
markets could represent a more efficient use of the unit’s time and energy in 
terms of man hours spent evaluating and aggregating information. 
Time not only represents one of the largest barriers to participation and 
implementation but also the most rectifiable. According to survey respondents, 
the single largest barrier to participation was a perceived lack of time, cited as a 
reason for reducing trading activity by 45% of total respondents.82  The solution 
to this problem does not require a great deal of elaboration or sophisticated 
problem solving. In fact, the simplest of solutions might be the most effective. A 
unit that chooses to employ a prediction market should not do so as an additional 
requirement. At least initially, a unit should provide a sanctioned block of time to 
allow for market participation that does not impinge on a participant’s current 
responsibilities. It would be naïve to assume that the above is all that is needed 
to solve the problem, but at a minimum, the survey responses represent a fairly 
clear description of one of the challenges facing military market creators. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
The experimental markets conducted highlight a number of key issues that 
should be taken seriously if a prediction market is to be implemented in the 
context of military decision-making. Additionally, there are more than a few 
reasons to be optimistic about the potential scale-ability of prediction markets in 
the military. In general terms, the survey evidence indicates that respondents 
                                            
82 See Appendix B, Figure 37. 
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believe that prediction markets have application in a wide variety of military 
contexts that is only limited by one’s imagination. Additionally, with the bulk of the 
evidence provided by the three experimental markets suggesting that prediction 
markets are feasible for use within a military organization, there is a great deal of 
motivation to search for areas of potential application. 
After identifying areas in which prediction markets might prove useful, the 
implementer or market maker must pay special attention to two key concepts: 
purpose and participation. Questions of purpose refer to what the market creator 
is attempting to achieve by initiating the market. For instance, the creator must 
decide whether or not the market will serve as an idea market designed to 
evaluate the utility of a particular piece of equipment or the potential efficacy of a 
particular strategy. The desired effect of the market will therefore drive the type of 
payoff mechanisms used. In addition, evaluating purpose also influences the type 
of contracts to be traded and the liquidity needed to drive the market. For 
instance, the JIFX market required a contract representing each experiment 
presented during the exercise. Had the number of participants dropped below a 
certain level, there might not have been enough liquidity to drive prices to 
equilibrium. Clearly this is speculation, but care should be taken to stay as close 
to the optimal number of contracts (8–12) as possible. 
Questions of participation relate to the aforementioned issues of time and 
incentives. The idea that tangible incentives are necessary can be discounted 
based on the available evidence from our experimental markets, which is a 
positive outcome for military units on a limited budget or those weary of 
encouraging the perception of “gambling.”  The military market creator should 
seek to focus on the major driving force of participation as indicated by the 
survey responses: relevant and interesting questions. As such, an investment of 
intellectual capital in the craftsmanship of clear, interesting and germane 
contracts are likely to see a substantial return in terms of participation. 
Furthermore, and as mentioned previously, allowing adequate time for such 
participation is a key requirement from the participant’s perspective. Simply 
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stated, the most interesting questions available can easily go unanswered if a 
trader feels as though their daily duties will suffer by participating. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED DURING EXPERIMENTATION 
Throughout our research and experimentation, we encountered several 
areas that deserve specific mention for those undertaking this sort of research in 
the future. The first, is that pop-culture or general knowledge type contracts are 
unnecessary to encourage participation. In point of fact, these types of questions 
can siphon attention away from contracts that the market administrator is truly 
interested in.  
Another area of lost focus is generated by user-initiated contracts. Our 
initial hypothesis was that allowing users to submit their own contracts to the 
market would be another way to encourage participation. In practice however, 
what we found was that the users submitting contracts were already prolific 
traders and had a great desire to participate and succeed in the market. Quickly, 
we realized that these user-defined contracts could easily shift the focus from 
relevant and interesting contracts to the entire market to contracts that were only 
interesting to certain niches of the market.  
Finally, we anticipated that the software’s comment system would be a 
key component of interest for military units, especially intelligence units. Our 
hypothesis in this regard was that the user created dialogue concerning each 
contract would not only increase the overall knowledge base of the market 
participants and encourage better trading, but that the dialogue created would 
lead to improved communication throughout the unit on issues of analysis, 
forecasting, and the subject matter of the contract. While we were not able to 
specifically determine whether or not this phenomena actually occurred, it was 
clear that comments on a trade or a contract could drive future trading action 
both positively and negatively. This is especially important in regards to senior-
subordinate relationships and user concerns over anonymity inside the 
marketplace.  
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The experimental markets tested in this research provide a great deal of 
insight regarding implementation, but due to limitations in research scope, do not 
provide evidence of accuracy when used by a military unit for decision-making 
purposes. Nor do they measure whether or not, or how often, military decision 
makers (especially Commanders) would utilize prediction market outcomes. 
Therefore, one logical step of research would be to implement the best practices 
recommended here for implementation in an effort to test the accuracy of the 
predictive markets and the efficacy of the idea markets. 
Some other areas of future research in this area of military prediction 
markets might focus on larger markets containing more participants, and longer 
markets consisting of contracts with a high rate of turnover.  
One area that we were able to test indirectly, and definitely an area of 
future interest, is that of binary contracts versus open-ended contracts. As we 
conducted our research, few, if any, prediction markets that we encountered 
asked open-ended questions. Our interactions with the units involved in our 
research have informed our opinion that while binary contracts are easy to trade 
on and pay off, open-ended questions are of great importance and utility to the 
military in general, and intelligence units in particular. Our experimentation shows 
that traders are willing to participate in contracts where an answer cannot be 
known, or will not be known until sometime later in the future.  
Finally, given the demographics of our markets and the nature of the 
military, it might be informative to test all-volunteer markets versus assigned-
personnel markets. While we believe that markets work best when those 
interested parties are given the ability to participate at their leisure, the military 
has a unique structure that might allow markets to flourish when individuals are 
assigned to participate as part of their normal duties. If nothing else, this would 
alleviate their concerns over their perceived time constraints. 
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APPENDIX A: PREDICTION MARKET EXPERIMENTATION DATA 
A. COMBINED MARKETS  
 
Figure 18.   Total registration status in percentage 
 
Figure 19.   Total participation in all markets as determined by the total number 
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B. JIFX/TSOA/RELIEF MARKET DATA 
1. Contracts 
 
Table 9.    All contracts for the JIFX market with basic statistics 
 
JIFX: Which of these technologies deploys with the smallest overall footprint 
(size of gear, amount of personnel needed to operate/maintain, etc...)?
2 5 2.50
JIFX: Which of these technologies is the least vulnerable to adversary 
activity (jamming, interception, deception, denial, spoofing, etc...)?
3 11 3.67
JIFX: Which of these technologies is the most l ikely to be present within US 
Army supply systems by 2015?
4 10 2.50
JIFX: Which one of these technologies provides the most immediate 
capability to units for use in Force Protection (tech that is mature and 
available for immediate employment)?
2 6 3.00
RELIEF: Which of these technologies deploys with the smallest footprint (size 
of gear, amount of personnel needed to operate/maintain it, etc...)?
2 5 2.50
RELIEF: Which of these technologies is the least vulnerable to adversary 
activity (jamming, interception, deception, denial, spoofing, etc...)?
2 3 1.50
RELIEF: Which of these technologies is the most l ikely to be present within US 
Army supply systems by 2015?
3 5 1.67
RELIEF: Which of these technologies provides the most immediate capability 
to units for use in Force Protection (tech is mature and available for 
immediate employment)?
5 11 2.20
TSOA: Which of these technologies deploys with the smallest footprint (size 
of gear, amount of personnel needed to operate/maintain it, etc...)?
22 55 2.50
TSOA: Which of these technologies is the least vulnerable to adversary 
activity (jamming, interception, deception, denial, spoofing, etc...)?
10 34 3.40
TSOA: Which of these technologies is the most l ikely to be present within US 
Army supply systems by 2015?
15 61 4.07
TSOA: Which of these technologies provides the most immediate capability 
to units for use in Force Protection (tech is mature and available for 
immediate employment)?
13 166 12.77
Will the planned draw-down in Military Manpower numbers make 
Deployable Force Protection Technologies for protecting small (<300 people) 
command posts more important?
7 9 1.29
Averages 6.92 29.31 3.35















Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5
JIFX: Which of these technologies deploys with the 
smallest overall footprint (size of gear, amount of 
personnel needed to operate/maintain, etc...)?
0 3 2 0 0 5 33 $1,654.05 3
JIFX: Which of these technologies is the least vulnerable 
to adversary activity (jamming, interception, deception, 
denial, spoofing, etc...)?
0 1 5 5 0 5 69 $3,472.07 5
JIFX: Which of these technologies is the most likely to be 
present within US Army supply systems by 2015?
0 6 3 0 1 5 62 $3,118.21 5
JIFX: Which one of these technologies provides the most 
immediate capability to units for use in Force Protection 
(tech that is mature and available for immediate 
employment)?
1 5 0 0 0 5 33 $1,661.24 3
RELIEF: Which of these technologies deploys with the 
smallest footprint (size of gear, amount of personnel 
needed to operate/maintain it, etc...)?
1 4 0 0 0 5 31 $1,568.85 4
RELIEF: Which of these technologies is the least 
vulnerable to adversary activity (jamming, interception, 
deception, denial, spoofing, etc...)?
1 2 0 0 0 5 25 $1,241.25 2
RELIEF: Which of these technologies is the most likely to 
be present within US Army supply systems by 2015?
1 3 1 0 0 5 24 $1,210.79 2
RELIEF: Which of these technologies provides the most 
immediate capability to units for use in Force Protection 
(tech is mature and available for immediate 
employment)?
6 2 3 0 0 5 86 $4,358.61 2
TSOA: Which of these technologies deploys with the 
smallest footprint (size of gear, amount of personnel 
needed to operate/maintain it, etc...)?
3 16 22 11 3 5 550 $29,948.57 6
TSOA: Which of these technologies is the least 
vulnerable to adversary activity (jamming, interception, 
deception, denial, spoofing, etc...)?
1 10 19 3 1 5 252 $12,985.55 6
TSOA: Which of these technologies is the most likely to 
be present within US Army supply systems by 2015?
3 18 17 22 1 5 636 $34,210.91 5
TSOA: Which of these technologies provides the most 
immediate capability to units for use in Force Protection 
(tech is mature and available for immediate 
employment)?
12 67 49 36 2 5 1629 $87,270.76 40
Will the planned draw-down in Military Manpower 
numbers make Deployable Force Protection 
Technologies for protecting small (<300 people) 
command posts more important?
0 0 0 5 4 2 123 $6,787.04 1
Averages 2.23 10.54 9.31 6.31 0.92 4.77 273.31 $14,575.99 6.46
Totals 29 137 121 82 12 3553 $189,487.90 84
# of days on 
market







# of trades per day
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2. Registration and Trading Statistics 
 
 
Figure 21.   JIFX market registration status 
 
Figure 22.   Total participation in the JIFX market as determined by the total 




JIFX Market Registration Status 
















Figure 23.   JIFX trades and traders by contract 
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Table 11.   MCIA market contracts and basic statistics 
How will President Chavez's health issue affect stability 
in Venezuela over the next 12 months?
17 32 1.88
How will the drug trade in Central America evolve in 
response to increased US counter-narcotics efforts over 
the next 5 years?
14 23 1.64
Nonstate actors can cheaply put an EFP or explosive on a 
semiautonomous(SA) UAV and aim it at a high impact 
target. What is the likelihood of the following occurring 
by 1/20/2013? 
9 17 1.89
North Korea will commit a provocative attack on US or 
South Korean interests within:
21 51 2.43
Which NFL team will sign former Indianapolis Colts 
quarterback Peyton Manning?
11 31 2.82
Which of the Men's NCAA Tournament #1 seeded teams 
will lose first?
7 22 3.14
Will another blue on green attack(Afghan National 
Security Forces attack on ISAF forces) occur in 
Afghanistan in the next two weeks?
6 13 2.17
Will Boko Haram's (Nigerian Islamist movement) 
increase in attacks against western influence ignite 
religious conflict throughout Nigeria in the next 12 
months?
10 14 1.40
Will Israel conduct a military attack on Iran prior to the 
US presidential elections in November 2012?
19 47 2.47
Will Libya devolve into civil war before March 2013? 12 20 1.67
Will Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remain in power 
through September 2012?
20 37 1.85
Will the US be involved in a NEO or humanitarian 
mission in Syria (or along the Syrian border) before the 
US presidential election?
12 21 1.75
Will Yemen experience a military coup before 31 
December 2012?
11 14 1.27
Averages 13.00 26.31 2.03
Totals 36 342
Contract
# of traders 
per contract
# of trades 
per contract





Table 12.   Detailed statistics for MCIA market contracts 
  
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8
How will President Chavez's health issue affect stability 
in Venezuela over the next 12 months?
15 3 4 5 4 0 0 1 8 210 $4,751.63 2
How will the drug trade in Central America evolve in 
response to increased US counter-narcotics efforts over 
the next 5 years?
8 5 2 5 2 0 0 1 8 159 $3,963.39 1
Nonstate actors can cheaply put an EFP or explosive on a 
semiautonomous(SA) UAV and aim it at a high impact 
target. What is the likelihood of the following occurring 
by 1/20/2013? 
5 8 0 0 4 0 0 0 8 77 $3,884.25 3
North Korea will commit a provocative attack on US or 
South Korean interests within:
27 12 0 9 1 0 0 2 8 370 $7,814.81 5
Which NFL team will sign former Indianapolis Colts 
quarterback Peyton Manning?
13 4 2 4 6 2 0 0 8 316 $6,842.39 0
Which of the Men's NCAA Tournament #1 seeded teams 
will lose first?
7 5 4 2 2 0 0 2 8 148 $3,845.86 0
Will another blue on green attack(Afghan National 
Security Forces attack on ISAF forces) occur in 
Afghanistan in the next two weeks?
0 0 0 11 2 0 0 0 5 82 $4,406.00 1
Will Boko Haram's (Nigerian Islamist movement) 
increase in attacks against western influence ignite 
religious conflict throughout Nigeria in the next 12 
months?
6 1 0 7 0 0 0 0 8 88 $4,449.10 1
Will Israel conduct a military attack on Iran prior to the 
US presidential elections in November 2012?
33 6 0 7 0 0 0 1 8 427 $25,792.62 1
Will Libya devolve into civil war before March 2013? 11 4 1 4 0 0 0 0 8 105 $4,915.90 0
Will Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remain in power 
through September 2012?
21 5 0 10 1 0 0 0 8 249 $13,947.20 4
Will the US be involved in a NEO or humanitarian 
mission in Syria (or along the Syrian border) before the 
US presidential election?
2 10 1 7 1 0 0 0 8 112 $5,389.09 2
Will Yemen experience a military coup before 31 
December 2012?
10 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 8 71 $3,464.49 0
Averages 12.15 5.00 1.08 5.62 1.77 0.15 0.00 0.54 7.77 185.69 $7,189.75 1.54
Totals 158 65 14 73 23 2 0 7 2414 $93,466.73 20
# of days on 
market







# of trades per day
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2. Registration and Trading Statistics 
 
Figure 25.   MCIA market registration status 
 
Figure 26.   Total participation in the MCIA market as determined by the total 
number of trades made 
67 
33 
Registration Rate for Invited Participants 














Figure 27.   MCIA trades and traders by contract 
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D. 2D INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 
1. Contracts 
Contract 
# of traders per 
contract 
# of trades per 
contract 
Avg # of 
trades per 
user 
According to GasBuddy.com, what will the average price for a gallon of 
unleaded gasoline be on Saturday, 24 March 2012, for the city of 
Jacksonville, NC? 
19 45 2.37 
What will the combined score of the Syracuse versus Ohio State Men’s 
NCAA Basketball Elite 8 game be on Saturday March 24th? 2 2 1.00 
Which of these teams will win the NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship? 19 71 3.74 
Which republican presidential candidate will win the Louisiana GOP 
primary on Saturday, 24 March 2012? 
20 61 3.05 
Who will be drafted first overall in the 2012 NFL Draft? 18 59 3.28 
Who will start at Quarterback for the NY Jets first regular season game? 9 14 1.56 
Will “The Hunger Games” bring in more than $120 million in its opening 
weekend? 
7 13 1.86 
Will a “green on blue” attack (ANSF attack against U.S./ISAF forces) occur in 
Afghanistan before 31 March 2012? 14 36 2.57 
Will a foreign or multinational military force fire on, invade, or enter Iran 
before 1 September 2012? 13 33 2.54 
Will a foreign or multinational military force fire on, invade, or enter Syria 
between 19 March 2012 and 31 December 2012? 15 32 2.13 
Will a North Korean or multinational military force fire on, invade, or enter 
South Korea before 1 June 2012? 19 43 2.26 
Will at least one official Taliban representative be appointed to serve as a 
minister in the Afghan government before 1 January 2013? 14 35 2.50 
Will Iran successfully detonate a nuclear device, either atmospherically, 
underground, or underwater before 1 January 2013? 19 42 2.21 
Will North Korea successfully launch a satellite before 30 April 2012? 8 14 1.75 
Will Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remain in power through 30 
September 2012? 12 28 2.33 
Will the New York Knicks beat the Toronto Raptors on Tuesday, March 
20th? 
11 15 1.36 
Will the U.S. be involved in a NEO or HA mission in Syria (or along the 
Syrian border) before the 2012 U.S. presidential election? 16 41 2.56 
Will U.S. President Barack Obama be re-elected? 
25 56 2.24 
Will Yemen experience a military coup before 31 December 2012? 
9 20 2.22 
Averages 14.16 34.74 2.29 
Totals 53 660   
Table 13.   2d Intel market contracts and basic statistics 
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Table 14.   2d Intel detailed statistics 
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9
According to GasBuddy.com, what will the average price 
for a gallon of unleaded gasoline be on Saturday, 24 
March 2012, for the city of Jacksonville, NC?
10 6 14 9 6 - - - - 6 522 $20,642.30 2
What will the combined score of the Syracuse versus 
Ohio State Men's NCAA Basketball Elite 8 game be on 
Saturday March 24th?
1 1 - - - - - - - 2 26 $3,866.20 0
Which of these teams will win the NCAA Men's 
Basketball Championship?
26 12 9 1 6 1 0 10 6 9 4145 $65,414.84 0
Which republican presidential candidate will win the 
Louisana GOP primary on Saturday, 24 March 2012?
11 6 27 12 3 2 0 0 0 6 1130 $59,843.16 3
Who will be drafted first  overall in the 2012 NFL Draft? 22 22 4 0 0 3 5 3 8 623 $34,485.68 3
Who will start at Quarterback for the NY Jets first regular 
season game?
- - - - - - - 5 9 2 300 $11,784.80 1
Will "The Hunger Games" bring in more than $120 
million in its opening weekend?
- - - - 2 10 1 - - 3 807 $52,442.46 1
Will a "green on blue" attack (ANSF attack against 
US/ISAF forces) occur in Afghanistan before 31 March 
2012?
7 10 8 3 1 0 2 5 0 9 520 $31,809.86 0
Will a foreign or multinational military force fire on, 
invade, or enter Iran before 1 September 2012? 6 8 8 3 2 0 0 2 4 9 314 $14,208.44 0
Will a foreign or multinational military force fire on, 
invade, or enter Syria between 19 March 2012 and 31 
December 2012?
4 3 13 2 1 0 1 4 4 9 530 $30,007.99 1
Will a North Korean or multinational military force fire 
on, invade, or enter South Korea before 1 June 2012?Â  10 12 9 2 2 2 1 3 2 9 623 $26,115.79 1
Will at least one official Taliban representative be 
appointed to serve as a minister in the Afghan 
government before 1 January 2013?
11 6 6 3 2 1 2 2 2 9 396 $23,453.42 4
Will Iran successfully detonate a nuclear device, either 
atmospherically, underground, or underwater before 1 
January 2013?
13 9 8 5 0 0 0 3 4 9 364 $16,145.73 1
Will North Korea successfully launch a satellite before 30 
April 2012?
- - - - - 5 6 2 1 4 95 $4,964.96 0
Will Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remain in power 
through 30 September 2012? 4 5 9 3 0 0 2 3 2 9 488 $28,679.03 1
Will the New York Knicks beat the Toronto Raptors on 
Tuesday, March 20th?
11 4 - - - - - - - 2 389 $26,166.63 1
Will the US be involved in a NEO or HA mission in Syria 
(or along the Syrian border) before the 2012 US 
presidential election?
8 8 13 2 4 0 1 2 3 9 311 $14,107.70 1
Will U.S. President Barack Obama be re-elected?
13 7 25 3 1 1 2 3 1 9 513 $24,850.53 4
Will Yemen experience a military coup before 31 
December 2012? 4 1 7 4 0 0 2 1 1 9 480 $25,610.45 0
Averages 9.27 7.50 12.71 4.00 2.00 1.47 1.53 3.33 2.80 6.95 661.89 $27,084.21 1.26
Totals 139 120 178 56 30 22 23 50 42 12576 $514,599.97 24
# of days on 
market







# of trades per day
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2. Registration and Trading Statistics 
 
Figure 29.   2d Intel market registration status 
 
 
Figure 30.   Total participation in the 2d Intel market as determined by the total 
number of trades made 
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Registration Rate for Invited Participants 













Figure 31.   2d Intel trades and traders by contract 
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APPENDIX B: PREDICTION MARKET SURVEY DATA 
A. COMBINED SURVEY DATA 
 
Figure 33.   Rank/Pay grades of market participants (combined market survey 
data) 
 
Figure 34.   Education Level of market participants (combined market survey 
data) 
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Question 1 – What is your pay grade? 
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Question 2 – What is the highest level of 
education you completed? 
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Figure 35.   Total market visits (combined market survey data) 
 
 
Figure 36.   Amount of time spent in the market per visit (combined market 
survey data) 



















Question 3 – How many times did you log onto 
the market during the entire week? 
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Less than 3 minutes
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Question 4 – How much time (on average) did 
you spend inside the market per visit? 
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Figure 38.   Percentage of those who conducted additional research in order to 
participate in the market (combined market survey data) 
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Question 5 - Which of the following was the 
biggest factor in your decision NOT to 
participate at a given moment? 
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Figure 40.   Reasons for reducing participation after initial trades were conducted 
(combined market survey data) 
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Question 7 – What factors influenced you to 
initially participate? Select all that apply. 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Not applicable
Felt questions achieved market…
Lack of time
Lack of incentive
Uninterested, questions were not…
Lack of confidence in anonymity or…
Did not fully understand the concept…
Technical/IT issues
Other




















Question 8 - If you made early trades but 
reduced your trading activity, what if anything, 
limited your participation? Select all that apply. 
 87 
 
Figure 41.   Likelihood for future participation in a prediction market (combined 
market survey data) 
 
 
Figure 42.   Likelihood of prediction market success at other units (combined 




Question 9 - Based upon your experience with 
this prediction market, would you participate in 
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B. JIFX/TSOA/RELIEF SURVEY DATA 
 
Figure 43.   Rank/Pay grade of market participants (JIFX market) 
 
 
Figure 44.   Education level of market participants (JIFX market) 
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Question 2 – What is the highest level of 
education you completed?  
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Figure 45.   Total market visits (JIFX market) 
 
 
Figure 46.   Average time spent per market visit (JIFX market) 
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Question 4 – How much time (on average) did 
you spend inside the market per visit?  
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Figure 47.   Factors for not participating (JIFX market) 
 
 
Figure 48.   Percentage of those who conducted additional research in order to 
participate (JIFX market) 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Lack of time
Lack of know how (in regards to…
A belief that your input does not…
No interest in the questions being…
No knowledge of the questions being…
Other
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biggest factor in your decision NOT to 
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Figure 49.   Factors that positively influenced participation (JIFX market) 
 
 
Figure 50.   Factors that reduced participation after initial trades were conducted 
(JIFX market) 
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Question 8 - If you made early trades but 
reduced your trading activity, what if anything, 
limited your participation? Select all that apply. 
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Figure 51.   Likelihood of future participation in a prediction market (JIFX market) 
 
 




Question 9 - Based upon your experience with 
this prediction market, would you participate in 







Question 10 – Do you believe you could utilize 





C. MCIA SURVEY DATA 
 
Figure 53.   Rank/Pay grade of market participants (MCIA market) 
 
 
Figure 54.   Education level of market participants (MCIA market) 
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Figure 55.   Total market visits (MCIA market) 
 
 
Figure 56.   Average time spent per market visit (MCIA market) 
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Question 4 – How much time (on average) did 
you spend inside the market per visit? 
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Figure 57.   Factors for not participating (MCIA market) 
 
 
Figure 58.   Participants that conducted additional research in order to participate 
(MCIA market) 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Lack of time
Lack of know how (in regards to…
A belief that your input does not…
No interest in the questions being…
No knowledge of the questions being…
Other



















Question 5 - Which of the following was the 
biggest factor in your decision NOT to 
participate at a given moment? 
60 
40 
Question 6 – Did you conduct any additional 





Figure 59.   Factors that positively influenced participation (MCIA market) 
 
 
Figure 60.   Factors that reduced participation after initial trades were conducted 
(MCIA market) 
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Question 8 - If you made early trades but 
reduced your trading activity, what if anything, 
limited your participation? Select all that apply. 
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Figure 61.   Likelihood of future participation in a prediction market (MCIA 
market) 
 




Question 9 - Based upon your experience with 
this prediction market, would you participate in 
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D. 2D INTELLIGENCE BATTALION SURVEY DATA 
 
Figure 63.   Rank/Pay grade of market participants (2d Intel market) 
 
Figure 64.   Education level of market participants (2d Intel market) 
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Question 2 – What is the highest level of 
education you completed? 
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Figure 65.   Total market visits (2d Intel market) 
 
 
Figure 66.   Average amount of time spent per visit (2d Intel market) 
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Question 4 – How much time (on average) did 
you spend inside the market per visit? 
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Figure 67.   Factors for not participating in the market (2d Intel market) 
 
 
Figure 68.   Participants that conducted additional research in order to participate 
in the market (2d Intel market) 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Lack of time
Lack of know how (in regards to…
A belief that your input does not…
No interest in the questions being…
No knowledge of the questions being…
Other
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biggest factor in your decision NOT to 
participate at a given moment? 
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Figure 69.   Factors that positively influenced participation (2d Intel market) 
 
 
Figure 70.   Factors that reduced participation after initial trades were conducted 
(2d Intel market) 
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Question 8 - If you made early trades but 
reduced your trading activity, what if anything, 
limited your participation? Select all that apply. 
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Question 9 - Based upon your experience with 
this prediction market, would you participate in 







Question 10 – Do you believe you could utilize 
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